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H. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Appellant Edward Stevens filed a motion for a new trial, challenging his conviction for 
first-degree murder, based upon two claims of newly discovered evidence. First, it was 
discovered post-trial that Propulsid, the acid-reflux medicine taken by eleven-month-old Casey 
Whiteside, the decedent, could cause cardiac arrest, especially at the high dosage prescribed to 
him and in combination with Zithromax, another medication taken by Casey. Propulsid could 
have been the cause of his death or what precipitated his accidental fall down the stairs which 
resulted in a skull fracture and the fatal brain injury. Second, a mortuary report was discovered 
showing that Casey's eyes were present when his body was embalmed, meaning that they were 
not removed at the autopsy, as assumed by defense counsel. Mr. Stevens argued that this new 
evidence was likely to result in an acquittal because post-embalming removal of the eyes could 
have caused trauma to the eyes and would have rebutted the state's theory that the eye trauma 
showed that Casey had been shaken before he received the skull and brain injuries. 
The trial court denied the new trial motion finding that: 1) the newly discovered evidence 
regarding Propulsid/Zithromax was not likely to result in an acquittal; and 2) the mortuary 
embalming report could have been found by defense counsel prior to trial with the exercise of 
due diligence. This Court found the trial court had not abused its discretion in denying the new 
trial motion and otherwise affirmed the conviction and sentence. State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 
191 P.3d 217 (2008). 
Mr. Stevens then filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief alleging that trial 
counsel was ineffective for: 1) failing to present the available evidence regarding 
Propulsid/Zithromax at trial; 2) for failing to discovcr the mortuary embalming report prior to 
trial; 3) for failing to present evidence from a radiologist which would have shown the skull 
fracture was 3-4 cm, not 8 cm as claimcd by the state; and 4) for failing to impeach the state's 
experts, Drs. Shaibani and Brady, with readily available information. He also alleged that the 
state had withheld material exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
(1963), i.e., that the eyes were removed post-embalming, and that appellate counsel was 
ineffective for failing to raise on appeal the motion to disqualify Justice Daniel Eismann from 
presiding over the new trial motion. This is an appeal from the judgment denying that petition 
for post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing. 
B. Procedural HistOlY 
Edward Stevens was charged with first-degree murder by causing the death of Casey 
Whiteside during the course of an aggravated battery. The state's theory was that Mr. Stevens, at 
that time a correctional officer with no prior criminal history, was left alone with a sick child and 
became suddenly enraged with the child, violently shook him, and then hit the child's head 
against the bathtub causing a large skull fracture and fatal brain injury. The defense was that Mr. 
Stevens was sleeping on the downstairs couch when Casey fell down the stairs, causing the skull 
fracture and the head and brain injuries. The first trial ended in a hung jury, the second in a 
guilty verdict. The trial court, the Honorable Daniel Eismann, presiding, sentenced Mr. Stevens 
to a fixed life sentence. A timely notice of appeal was filed and the State Appellate Public 
Defender was appointed to represent Mr. Stevens. CR 8-9. 
The appellate proceedings were stayed pending ruling on the new trial motion. Mr. 
Stevens argued that he should get a new trial because there was newly discovered evidence that 
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Propulsid, a drug being given to Casey, could cause cardiac events, including arrest leading to 
death, especially when taken with Zithromax, as was the case here. He also argued that the 
recently found Mortuary Embalming Report showed that Casey's eyes were still present when he 
was embalmed, post-autopsy, at the funeral home. Thus, the state's testimony that the eyes were 
removed at the autopsy, carefully preserved, and shipped without further alteration to a nationally 
known pediatric eye specialist was false. Justice Eismann denied the motion holding that the 
requirements of Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 651 P.2d. 546 (1982), had not been shown 
because: 1) even though the evidence regarding Propulsid was newly discovered it was not 
material nor would it have resulted in an acquittal and 2) the Mortuary Embalming Report could 
have been discovered by defense counsel in the exercise of due diligence. This Court held that 
Justice Eismann did not abuse his discretion in denying the new trial motion. State v. Stevens, 
146 Idaho at 45-6, 191 P.3d at 223-224. 
On July 23,2009, Mr. Stevens filed a petition for post-conviction relief. CR 8. As noted 
above, he alleged that trial counsel was ineffective under the Sixth Amendment and Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984). He further alleged that the state had violated Brady v. 
Maryland, supra, by withholding the evidence that Casey's eyes were removed post-embalming 
from the defense. And he alleged that appellate counsel was ineffective under Strickland because 
they did not raise on appeal the denial of the motion to disqualifY Justice Daniel Eismann from 
presiding over the new trial motion. CR 8-23. 
On April 13, 2010, the state filed an Answer. CR 271-344. On June 1,2010, Mr. 
Stevens filed a motion for summary disposition supported by a memorandum of law and 
affidavits. CR 348; 351-371; 373-394. The Respondent filed its own motion for summary 
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disposition on June 17, 2010. CR 396. The court denied Mr. Stevens's motion, but partially 
granted the state's motion and set the matter for an evidentiary hearing. CR 1757-1783; 1817-
1827. In particular, the court summarily dismissed the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 
claim holding that "[t]he Supreme Court in its inherent power has the ultimate administrative 
authority in the judicial assignment." CR 1780, see also CR 1806. 
The court, however, permitted the Brady and Strickland claims to proceed to an 
evidentiary hearing. 
C. Evidence Presented at the Trial and Evidentiary Hearing 
1. Evidence From the Criminal Trial 
The district court took judicial notice of the transcript from the criminal trial and of the 
clerk's record on appeal. Copies of each were introduced as trial exhibits. Petitioner's Ex. A-E. 
The following is a summary of the trial testimony. It is largely an edited version of the statement 
offacts in Mr. Steven's opening brief on direct appeal. Although lengthy, an understanding of 
the evidence at the criminal trial is needed to recognize the highly circumstantial nature of the 
evidence used to convict Mr. Stevens and to provide context for the evidence and argument 
presented at the post-conviction proceedings. 
(a) Background 
Michelle Daniels, Casey's mother, and Casey moved in with Ed Stevens at 3133 Mirage 
Court in Meridian, Idaho, in July of 1996. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 601, In. 7 p. 602, In. 4.) Ms. 
Daniels had seen Casey playing on the stairs at their new home. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 635, In. 3 p. 
636, In. 16.) She said that Casey would often climb the stairs and they actually made a game of it 
with Ms. Daniels following Casey up to the top of the stairs, picking him up, laughing, hugging 
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and kissing him. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 703, In. 25 p. 706, In. 1.) Once, Casey fell off of one step, 
bumped his head, and got a bruise, but they never got a gate for the stairs. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 706, In. 
17 p. 707, In. 11.) 
Mr. Stevens worked as a Correctional Officer at the state prison, but took a second job 
with Ada Towing so that Casey, along with his half-siblings Donny and lale, could have a nice 
Christmas. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 671, In. 15 - p. 672, In. 9.) Ms. Daniels testified that Mr. Stevens 
would call Casey names which were intended to get a rise out of her "sometimes." (Tr. Vol. II, 
p. 708, In. 12-25.) She once sent Mr. Stevens a card signed "Michelle and Mr. Shitty Diapers." 
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 690, In. 2-15.) Donny and lale would frequently stay overnight at the house and 
trusted Mr. Stevens with them. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 672, In. lOp. 674, In. 22.) Mr. Stevens took a 
father figure role with Casey, feeding him, changing his diapers, holding him, hugging him, 
kissing him, and loving him. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 677, In. 20 p. 678, In. 24.) She said that while he 
sometimes got frustrated with Casey, Mr. Stevens never hit him or screamed at him. (Tr. Vol. II, 
p. 708, In. 7-11.) 
Ms. Daniels took Casey to a Savers store in Boise on the 16th or 17th of December, 1996. 
Casey managed to wiggle his way out of the shopping cart and fall approximately 32 inches to 
the floor. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 709, In. 1 p. 710, In. 12.) Casey went to stay with his father on 
December 23, 1996; when he left Ms. Daniels' care, Casey did not have a bruise on his back, but 
he did when he returned home. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 693, In. 23 - p. 694, In. 16.) 
On December 26, 1996, Ms. Daniels came home from work and noticed a red mark on 
Casey's forehead. Mr. Stevens told her that Casey had fallen down the stairs, which she 
believed. (Tr. VoUI, p. 636, In. 14 p. 637, In. 25.) Ms. Daniels gave Casey something to drink 
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and he projectile vomited. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 638, In. 1-11.) Mr. Stevens cleaned him up, but Casey 
vomited again while they were taking him up the stairs to bed. Mr. Stevens cleaned him up again 
in the upstairs bathroom. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 638, In. 15 - p. 639, In. 5.) Casey, Ms. Daniels, and Mr. 
Stevens all slept in the master bedroom and Casey was vomiting all night. Michelle said she got 
up at some point during the night and slept on the couch because "Casey was a wiggler and 
kicked me out of bed," but she eventually went back to the master bedroom. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 641, 
In. 12 p. 643, In. 20.) Casey vomited at least twice before she left the bedroom. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 
696, In. 17 p. 697, In. 3.) 
In the morning of December 27, Ms. Daniels took a bath and noticed there was no vomit 
on the bathtub. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 645, In. 3-21.) She dressed Casey in blue jeans and a green and 
brown checkered long sleeve shirt with shoes and socks. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 645, In. 2-12.) Although 
Mr. Stevens had already dressed for work, Ms. Daniels asked him to take the day off of work and 
stay with Casey. Mr. Stevens agreed and called in sick. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 646, In. 3 - p. 647, In. 
14.) Ms. Daniels described Casey as playing on his horse, but not his usual self, not very bubbly, 
just standing there, when she left the house at about 1:00 or 1:30 p.m. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 650, In. 18 
p.651,ln.l0.) 
(b) Facts surrounding Casey's injury and death 
Mr. Stevens called 911 at approximately 3:05 p.m. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 958, In. 25 - p. 959, In. 
11.) He informed the dispatcher that he was an ex-EMT and attempted to perform CPR while 
speaking with the dispatcher, repeatedly stating "Casey, come on" and "come on Casey." (Tr. 
Vol. II, p. 959, In. 14 -po 961, In. 6.) Mr. Stevens told 911 that he was dozing off and heard a 
thump and found Casey at the bottom of the stairs. Ms. Daniels confirmed that Mr. Stevens is a 
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heavy sleeper. (Tr. Vo!' II, p. 687, In. 22 - p. 688, In. 8.) Emergency medical personnel and 
police officers were dispatched and arrived about five minutes later. (Tr. Vo!' II, p. 959, In. 14-
p. 961, In. 6.) The EMTs took over for Mr. Stevens and began working on Casey who was on a 
counter top. (Tr. Vo!' II, p. 60, In. 13 - p. 69, In. 1.) Casey was wearing blue socks and pants, 
but did not have on a shirt or shoes. (Tr. Vo!' II, p. 65, In. 8-14.) Casey was not breathing and 
did not have a pulse. (Tr. Vo!' II, p. 66, In. 4 - p. 67, In. 6; p. 80, In. 16-23.) EMT Campbell 
described Ed as being panicked. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 75, In. 5-9.) EMT McEvoy testified that on most 
occasions when he responds to a call of a child falling, they would be conscious and crying. (Tr. 
Vol. II, p. 82, In. 3 - p. 83, In. 6.) Mr. Stevens continued to encourage Casey. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 75, 
In. 20-24.) 
Paramedics arrived at about 3:13. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 87, In. 7 p. 89, In. 7.) Casey was still 
pulseless and not breathing and attempts at intubation were not successful. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 89, In. 
20 p. 90, In. 1.) Casey was hooked up to a heart monitor but he was flatlined, indicating no 
heart activity. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 91, In. 1-13.) Casey had several bruises on his face. (Tr. VoUI, p. 
93, In. 11-15.) Casey was transported to the hospital at 3:36 p.m. and arrived at St. Alphonsus 
Hospital (hereinafter, St. AI's) at 3:51. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 92, In. 1 - p. 93, In. 4.) Casey did have a 
heart rhythm when they arrived at the hospital. (Tr. Vo!' II, p. 98, In. 19-22.) Mr. Stevens again 
said that he had fallen asleep, heard a fall, and then saw Casey at the bottom of the stairs on the 
hardwood floor. (Tr. Vo!' II, p. 96, In. 19 - p. 97, In. 1.) 
Dr. Ronald Jutzy, a neurosurgeon, responded to St. AI's to treat Casey sometime between 
4:30 and 5:00 p.m. (Tr. Vo!' II, p. 1244, In. 8 p. 1248, In. 22.) Casey did not have any signs of 
brainstem activity. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1250, In. 24 -- p. 1251, In. 4.) Upon arrival at 3:55 p.m., 
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Casey's body temperature was 93.8 degrees. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1255, In. 14-23.) His temperature at 
4:40 p.m. was 90.3 degrees. ('1'r. Vol. II, p. 1253, In. 20 - p. 1254, In. 6.) Casey had severe 
cerebral edema which can lead to intracranial pressure. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1260, In. 5-15.) Casey's 
spine was normal and intact, a finding inconsistent with him having just been shaken. (Tr. Vol. 
II, p. 1262, In. 5-17.) Dr. Jutzy testified that the findings of intracranial pressure at autopsy are 
distorted because, after the brain has died, cells continue to rupture, and the edema will actually 
become worse sometimes. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1273, In. 10-19.) The pressure buildup, over time, can 
cause retinal hemorrhages. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1273, In. 25 - p. 1274, In. 8.) Dr. Jutzy testified that a 
severe fall off of a staircase onto a hardwood floor can cause shearing and tearing injuries in the 
brain. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1274, I. 21 p. 1275, In. 15.) No head X-rays were taken at St. AI's, a fact 
which is important in the post-conviction proceedings. 
Since St. AI's did not have a pediatric intensive care unit, Casey was transported to St. 
Luke's Hospital where Dr. Susan Kim, a pediatrician, saw him at about 6:00. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 107, 
In. 4-25.) Casey was without spontaneous movements, he did not respond to stimuli, his 
breathing was completely taken over by a ventilator and he had no signs of brain activity. (Tr. 
Vol. II, p. 108, In.11-18.) Nevertheless, Dr. Kim attempted to treat the brain swelling with 
Mannitol, a drug that is injected into the patient in an attempt to induce rapid breathing. (Tr. Vol. 
II, p. 140, In. 18 - p. 141, In. 23.) 
The blood work indicated that Casey was suffering from consumptive coagulation, a 
blood clotting disorder that, in Casey's case, was likely not hereditary. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 147, In. 10 
p. 153, In. 16.) Dr. Kim testified that coagulopathy can cause abnormal bruisability, retinal 
hemonhages without impact, subdural hematomas without impact, and subarachnoid 
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hemorrhages without impact. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 152, In. 24 - p. 153, In. 16.) Tests done while 
Casey was at St. AI's revealed that he had a low PH level of6.89 and a temperature of93.8 
degrees suggesting that he was without effective circulation or respiration "for a significant 
amount of time." (Tr. Vo!' II,p.117,ln.23 p.118,ln.22;Tr. Vol.lI,p. 122, In. 12-19.) The 
low temperature level was possibly caused by ineffective circulation and ineffective breathing or 
may have been environmentally induced. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 119, In. 4-13.) In addition, when Casey 
went for a check-up prior to December 27, his temperature was low. The low PH level indicates 
that Casey had excess acid in his body which can be caused by ineffective breathing or 
ineffective circulation. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 119, In. 14-25.) Dr. Kim testified that from her review of 
the records, Casey was asystolic, meaning he had no electrical activity in his heart, when he was 
in the ambulance but a heart beat appeared on the monitors when he arrived at St. AI's. (Tr. Vol. 
II, p. 126, In. 21 - p. 128, In. 8.) 
Mr. Stevens told Dr. Kim that he fell asleep and awoke to hear a thump and went to the 
bottom of the stairs and found Casey laying there, head back, back arched, and legs stiff. (Tr. 
Vol. II, p. 113, In. 5-16.) 
Dr. David Bettis, a pediatric neurologist, also examined Casey and determined that he 
was deeply comatose and unresponsive and he had retinal hemorrhages and papildema, or 
swelling of the optic nerve consistent with increased pressure in the head. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1059, 
In. 4 - p. 1065, In. 18.) A CT scan showed evidence of brain swelling and an EEG showed no 
evidence of brain activity. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1066, In. 9-24.) Casey was declared brain dead at 
approximately 10:38 a.m. on December 28, 1996. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1068, In. 2-7.) Dr. Bettis 
testified that Casey's low body temperature upon arrival at St. AI's suggested that there was more 
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than a brief period of time elapsed, from several minutes to "possibly more than an hour:' 
between the time of cardiac and/or respiratory arrest and the time the temperature was taken. (Tr. 
Vol. II, p. 1071, In.16 - p. 1073, In. 5.) 
Dr. Stan McCart, a physician at Mercy Medical Center, examined Casey on October 12, 
1996. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 523, In. 5 p. 526, In. 12.) Casey's temperature, taken axillary, or under 
his arm, was 94.6 degrees. Dr. McCart said the low temperature was not unusual because: a) 
temperature taken axillary is usually a degree or two lower than temperature taken orally; and b) 
98.6 degrees is an average temperature but people can have an orally taken temperature of 96 
degrees and it would still be "normal." (Tr. Vol. II, p. 549, In. 7 p. 551, In. 13.) 
Dr. Bettis said that Casey's low PH level is associated with how long he went without any 
heart beat and breathing; a normal PH level is approximately 7.4 and would drop rapidly when 
the heart stops beating. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1105, In. 8 - p. 1106, In. 20.) 
Dr. Bettis opined that Casey could not have suffered the constellation of injuries he had 
from a fall down the stairs. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1073, In. 6-23.) He noted that Casey's skull fracture 
was of the right occipital bone and it was not diastic, or not "spread apart." (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1087, 
In. 10 p. 1091, In. 9.) He also noted a small "subarachnoid hemorrhage," or hemorrhage over 
the surface of the brain. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1091, In. 10 - p. 1092, In. 7.) 
Dr. Gregory Kent, a general ophthalmologist, took slides of Casey's eyes and noted 
retinal hemorrhaging of two types. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 746, In. 10 - p. 752, In. 17.) A "dot" or "blot 
hemorrhage" occurs in a specific layer of the retina while a "flame hemorrhage" occurs in a nerve 
fiber tract. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 752, In. 21 - p. 753, In. 18.) Importantly for this case, he did not note 
any macular or retinal folding. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 754, In. 18-21.) 
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David Sherner, a deputy coroner for Ada County, testified that the cause of death was 
cerebral edema (swelling) or cerebral anoxia (lack of oxygen to the brain), and the manner of 
death was unknown. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 215, In. 9 - p. 220, In. 8.) He did not note any fingerprints 
or handgrip marks (Tr. Vol. II, p. 223, In. 16 p. 225, In. 20), as might be expected if Casey had 
been violently shaken. 
Dr. Ronald Slaughter testified that he is a general, not a forensic, pathologist. 
Nevertheless, he performed the autopsy on Casey. (Tr. Vol. II, p.375, In. 19 - p. 376, In. 9.) He 
did, however, testifY that he contacted two forensic pathologists prior to performing the autopsy. 
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 378, In. 1-14.) He noted a lot of bruises on Casey of various ages, most of which 
were more than 72 hours old. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 381, In. 2 - p. 384, In.18; Tr. Vol. II, p. 425, In. 15 
- p. 426, In. 10.) Dr. Slaughter testified that he removed and examined the internal organs 
finding abnormalities only in the brain, bronchial pneumonia in the lungs (secondary to the 
trauma) and pooling of the blood in the heart (also secondary to the trauma). (Tr. Vol. II, p. 388, 
In. 17 p. 390, In. 1.) Casey had a fresh bruise to the top part of his head. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 392, In. 
24 p. 393, In. 2.) Casey had a very fresh subdural hematoma and no evidence of any old 
subdural hematomas. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 396, In. 8-22; Tr. Vol. II, p. 407, In. 7-10.) He noted a 
complex skull fracture of the occipital bone of Casey's skull that was not diastatic, or separated. 
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 400, In. 3 p. 403, In. 17; Tr. Vol. II, p. 431, In. 20 - p. 432, In. 15.) Casey had 
no injuries to his long bones and ribs, no injuries to his internal organs, and there were no injuries 
to his neck. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 425, In. 6-11; Tr. Vol. II, p. 432, In. 19 - p. 435, In. 5.) 
Dr. Slaughter determined the cause of death to be blunt force trauma causing a large 
complex skull fracture which caused cerebral edema, or brain swelling, which led to herniation 
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into the foramen magnum, pinching off the spinal cord and causing death. ('rr. Vol. II, p. 407, In. 
11 - p. 409, In. 5.) 
Dr. Slaughter testified that he removed Casey's eyes and sent them to Dr. Brooks 
Crawford. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 411, In. 12-25.) He did not, however, testify that he removed the eyes 
at the autopsy. Id. After the trial a mortuary embalming report indicated that Casey's eyes were 
still in situ after the autopsy and just prior to embalming after transp0l1 to the funeral home. 
(c) Mr. Stevens's statements and the police investigation 
Several people interacted with Mr. Stevens just before and while Casey was being 
treated. Mary Prall, a family friend, said she called Mr. Stevens' house and spoke with him 
around 2:30 p.m. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 571, In. 6 - p. 572, In. 6.) She spoke to him for a couple of 
minutes and did not hear anything in the background. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 572, In. 9 - p. 573, In. 5.) 
Mr. Stevens was very calm and formal during the conversation. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 573, In. 6-9.) 
She got a call from Mr. Stevens between 3:00 and 3:30 and he calmly informed her that Casey 
had fallen down the stairs and that paramedics were there working on him. He asked her to 
come to the house and wait for Ms. Daniels to return. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 573, In. 10 - p. 574, In. 
12.) (She later saw Mr. Stevens at St. Luke's Hospital and thought that "He acted like he was 
crying, but he wasn't," but that did not strike her as odd at the time because she was in turmoil 
herself. Tr. Vol. II, p. 575, In. 12 p. 576, In. 16.) 
Lt. Robert Stowe was the first officer to arrive at the house. (Tr. p. 909, In. 18 - p. 913, 
In. 15.) He thought that Mr. Stevens did not appear to be emotional or upset, although he 
assumed that Mr. Stevens had received training in how to deal with stressful situations as part of 
his prison guard employment. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 914, In. 19 - p. 918, In. 1; p. 943, In. 25 p.944, 
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In.14.) Mr. Stevens told him that he was sleeping on the couch while Casey was playing on a 
rolling rocking chair on the living room floor when he heard several thumps which woke him 
up; he immediately knew Casey had fallen down the stairs; he found Casey at the bottom of the 
stairs, started CPR, and called 911. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 919, In. 11-21.) He also told Lt. Stowe that 
Casey had also fallen down the stairs a few days prior. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 919, In. 22 p. 920, In. 
3.) Mr. Stevens told Lt. Stowe that Casey had been up the night before sick and crying so they 
took him to the master bedroom with them. (Tr. Vol. II, p.920, In. 4-15. 
Detective Jim Miller also went to the residence. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1008, In. 20 p. 1011, 
In. 20.) Mr. Stevens appeared to be concerned about Casey. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1015, In.l3 - p. 
1017, In. 2.) Mr. Stevens said that he dozed off and the next thing he heard was Casey coming 
down the stairs and hitting the bottom. He also said that Casey was laying on his back about a 
foot away from the stairs with his head tipped back and eyes wide open with his legs straight 
and "stiff as a board;" he went over and picked Casey up, tried CPR, saw that Casey's eyes were 
fixed and dilated; took Casey into the bedroom, laid him on the bed, looked at his eyes with a 
flashlight and got no response, took snow and rubbed it on his face and feet with no response; 
took Casey into the kitchen, called the paramedics and statted CPR. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1017, In. 3-
16; Tr. Vol. II, p. 1017, In. 23 -po 1019, In. 7; Tr. Vol. II, p. 1041, In.lO-p. 1042, In. 11; Tr. 
Vol. II, p. 1044, In. 4-20.) He also told Detective Miller that he was concerned for Ms Daniels 
and how she would react and that Casey had many bruises because he fell a lot. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 
1019, In. 11 p. 1020, In. 16.) Detective Miller did not see any blood at the bottom of the 
staircase or on Casey. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1021, In. 17 p. 1022, In. 1.) Mr. Stevens told Detective 
Miller that Casey bruised very easily and thought he may have some sort of hemophilia, that 
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Casey had fallen down one stair two or three days prior, and that Casey had been very sick the 
night before and was projectile vomiting. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1023, In.I-23.) 
When Ms. Daniels returned home, she was taken by police officers to St. AI's. (Tr. Vol. 
II, p. 657, In. 12 - p. 658, In. 7.) When she asked Mr. Stevens what happened he told her, "It 
wasn't the fucking time for this." (Tr. Vol. II, p. 658, In. 9-20.) 
Tanya Cole saw Mr. Stevens at the hospital. She thought he looked pale, as if he had 
just thrown up. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 364, In. 6 - p. 365, In. 2.) Her husband, Don, testified that Ed 
was really upset, devastated, not really talking to anyone, and looked "[l]ike a parent would be." 
(Tr. VoI.II,p.1758,ln.l-p.1760,l.I6.) 
Mickey Muir saw Mr. Stevens at the St. AI's emergency room and he told her that he fell 
asleep and that Casey had fallen down the stairs. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 278, In. 12 - p. 280, In. 10.) 
She said Mr. Stevens told her that "only me and God will know" what happened. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 
280, In. 11-24.) Ms. Muir, however, did not tell law enforcement about this alleged statement, 
despite previously contacting them after Casey's death and agreeing to record conversations, 
until ten months after the statement was supposedly made. (Tr. Vol. n p. 310, In. 15 p. 317, 
In. 25.) 
Peggy Gallagher, a chaplain at St. AI's, said that Mr. Stevens' behavior seemed bizarre 
to her as he was pacing, seemed uptight and very tense, and that he beat on some glass doors. 
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 895, In. 25 p. 900, In. 1.) She also testified that "God created us all differently 
and we do react differently." (Tr. Vol. II, p. 900, In. 2 p. 901, In. 11.) Mr. Stevens kept 
repeating that it was all his fault. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 901, In. 10-14.) Mr. Stevens told her that he 
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nodded off and Casey fell down the stairs and he felt responsible. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 901, In. 23 - p. 
902, In. 25.) 
Deborah Cole met Mr. Stevens, Ms. Daniels, and other well-wishers at St. Luke's. (Tr. 
Vol. II, p. 1704, In. 22 - p. 1705, In. 10.) She said that Mr. Stevens was really upset and that he 
was crying. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1705, In. 22 p. 1706, In. 19.) 
Detective Miller, along with his brother Detective Joe Miller, took Mr. Stevens to the 
police station and into an interview room where they Mirandized1 him. Mr. Stevens waived his 
rights. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1033, In. 2 p. 1038, In. 14.) Detective Jim Miller confronted Mr. 
Stevens with his belief that he was not being honest and Mr. Stevens told him that he realized 
that he was the suspect in a homicide investigation. (Tr. Vol. II, p.1038, In. 20 - p. 1039, In. 4.) 
Jim Miller admitted that Mr. Stevens was basically consistent in his statements about what had 
happened. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1149, In. 9 p. 1451, In. 6.) 
(d) Casey's medical history 
Casey had a reflux problem and would projectile vomit, usually within ten minutes after 
he was fed, but would sometimes vomit a half and hour or more later. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 683, In. 14 
p. 685, In. 10.) Casey also had reoccurring ear infections. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 692, In. 24-25.) 
Casey was taking Propulsid for his reflux problem at the time of his death, and Zithromax, an 
antibiotic, for his earaches. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 690, In. 16 - p. 691, In. 11.) At one point, Ms. 
Daniels believed that Casey had a balance problem as he would often fall down. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 
712, In. 2. p. 713, In. 12.) 
I Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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Casey's pediatrician, Dr. Robert Emerson, testified. He said that Casey had an unusually 
large number of ear infections starting early in life. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1127, In. 16-22.) He also 
testified that he never saw Casey with numerous bruises and would have reported it if he 
suspected Casey abuse. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1128, In. 13-16; p. 1132, In. 12-23.) On March 6,1996, 
Ms. Daniels brought Casey to him because Casey was vomiting. Dr. Emerson proscribed 
Propulsid, an anti-reflux medication, to be administered orally two to three times per day. (Tr. 
Vol. II, p. 1139, In. 15 - p. 1140, In. 10.) On October 29, 1996, Dr. Emerson increased the 
dosage. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1160, In. 9 - p. 1161, In. 11.) On December 17, 1996, Dr. Emerson 
proscribed Zithromax, an antibiotic to treat an ear infection, for Casey. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1129, In. 
6 p. 1130, In. 3) Ms. Daniels testified that Casey was on his reflux medication on December 
26,1996. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 638, In. 12-14.) 
As will be discussed below, by the time of Mr. Steven's second trial, it was readily 
available knowledge in the medical community that Propulsid should not be prescribed to 
children, especially in combination with drugs in the same class of drugs as Zithromax, due to 
the danger of fatal heart arrhythmia. This fact was not presented to the jury, however. 
(e) The battle of the experts 
Dr. William Brady, a pathologist, hired by the state to review the materials related to 
Casey opined that "Casey had an exceedingly severe skull fracture that not only is large, long 
(8.5 cm.), but it also is located in a very unusual area of the skull when it comes to baby skull 
fractures." (Tr. Vol. II, p. 445, In. 19 - p. 457, In. 9.) The skull fracture was measured at the 
time of autopsy. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 457, In. 6-7.) Dr. Brady testified that the subdural hematoma 
was secondary to the blunt force trauma to Casey's occipital bone (back of the skull), and the 
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injury to the front of his head was not associated with the injury to the occipital bone as the 
trauma would have caused immediate unconsciousness. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 460, In. 14 - p. 461, In. 
25.) Dr. Brady testified that it would take a lot of force to cause this type of injury and that the 
area damaged is generally well protected in infants. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 462, In. 13 - p. 464, In. 6.) 
Casey's skull came into contact with something solid, not rough or sharp, either rounded or flat, 
possibly the side of a bathtub. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 467, In. 20 - p. 468, In. 22.) Dr. Brady testified 
that in his opinion, Casey's injuries did not result from a fall down the stairs because he would 
have slid and his momentum would have slowed and he would have had scrapes on him. (Tr. 
Vol. II, p. 470, In. 21- p. 472, In. 12.) 
On cross-examination, Dr. Brady testified that Casey would have been unconscious 
immediately, but that the cerebral tonsillar herniation (herniation into the foramen magnum 
compromising the baseline functions such as breathing) would have come hours later, probably. 
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 475, In. 23 - p. 478, In. 25.) Dr. Brady admitted that he testified previously that 
the fracture was diastatic but he now believes that it was not diastatic. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 486, In. 9 -
p. 487, In. 23.) Dr. Brady testified that the hardwood floor at the bottom of the stairs in the 
Stevens home qualifies as a smooth, hard surface. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 488, In. 23 p. 489, In. 22.) 
Dr. Brady testified that intracranial pressure can be responsible for subarachnoid hemorrhaging 
and coagulopathy can exacerbate subdural hematomas. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 491, In. 2 - p. 492, In. 
14.) Dr. Brady admitted that he is aware ofliterature suggesting that skull fractures in kids 
Casey's age can occur from short distance falls of less than four feet, that professional opinions 
can vary, and that he has been wrong in the past. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 494, In. 11 - p. 496, L.24.)2 
------~----~--~--
In the motion for new trial and in the post-conviction petition, Mr. Stevens presented 
evidence that Dr. Brady had testified falsely for the prosecution, in a capital murder case against Don 
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Dr. Brooks Crawford is an ophthalmologist and eye pathologist at the University of 
California Medical School in San Francisco who was hired by the state. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 755, In. 
16 - p. 766, In. 22.) Dr. Crawford testified that he was sent Casey's eyes by Dr. Slaughter. (Tr. 
Vol. II, p. 766, In. 23 p. 767, In. 4.) Casey's eyes showed macular folds which used to be 
believed to be pathognomonic, or 100% certain, of shaken baby syndrome, with only two known 
cases that were not caused by shaking, as they are caused by a rotational force, such as from 
whiplash. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 774, In. 11 - p. 777, In. 4; p. 840, In. 20 p. 842, In. 11.) The back of 
Casey's eyes also showed hemorrhages, which are usually caused by a shearing force tearing the 
internal limiting membrane. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 777, In. 5 - p. 778, In. 6.) However, the injury 
could also have been caused by Terson's syndrome. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 778, In. 13 - p. 779, In. 7.) 
Casey also had bilateral retinal hemorrhages meaning they occurred in both eyes. (Tr. 
Vol. II, p. 785, In. 22 - p. 786, In. 11.) Dr. Crawford noted papilledema, that is, the optic nerve 
was swollen and was more pale then it should have been, and opined that the nerve swelling was 
caused by the swelling in the brain. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 786, In. 19 p. 787, In. 15.) Dr. Crawford 
opined that the constellation of injuries he saw were caused by violent shaking. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 
789, In. 13-20.) The eyes also revealed that Casey had hemorrhages on the periphery which he 
believed was highly suggestive of shaken baby syndrome, and Dr. Crawford relied upon a study 
from England that suggested that the phenomenon was unique to shaken baby syndrome. (Tr. 
Vol. II, p.779, In. 8 - p. 780, In. 11; p. 782, In. 25 - p. 783, In. 25.) Dr. Crawford noted in the 
Paradis and then later bragged that his false testimony helped convict the man. (Def. New Trial Mot. 
Ex 0-13 (Affidavit of William B. Russell, Jr.).) The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found his 
testimony at Paradis' trial to be "severely implausible in light of his own prior findings." See 
Paradis v. Arave, 130 F.3d 385, 395 (9th Cir. 1997). 
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area behind the eye, there was a little hemorrhage that is highly suggestive of shaken baby, 
although it can also be caused by Terson's syndrome, which is caused by intercranial pressure. 
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 784, In. 1 - p. 785, In. 21.) Relying upon the studies available at the time, he 
opined that Terson's syndrome and head traumas can cause small retinal hemorrhages. (Tr. 
Vol.II, p. 789, In. 21 p. 793, In. 14.) Dr. Crawford testified that Casey's injuries could not 
have occurred as a result of a single blow to the back of the head, CPR, or a congenital clotting 
defect, but that violent shaking must have occurred. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 793, In. 18 - p. 795, In. 20.) 
Dr. Crawford admitted that accidental trauma can result in retinal hemorrhages. (Tr. 
Vol. II, p. 818, In. 18-20.) He also stated it was possible, albeit doubtful, that Casey had retinal 
hemorrhages prior to December 27, 1996. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 827, In. 18 - p. 828, In. 4.) 
Dr. Crawford described Terson's syndrome as intracranial subdural hemorrhages caused by 
intercranial pressure; the blood takes up space and there is only so much room for it and the 
brain swells which, in about 20% of the cases leads to hemorrhages around the optic nerve. 
Casey had several of these hemorrhages and they could have been caused by Terson's 
syndrome; however, that type of pressure would not explain the tearing of the membrane which 
needs a shearing force so at least one of the hemorrhages was not consistent with intracranial 
pressure. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 852, In. 15 - p. 854, In. 16.) 
The state's next hired expert was Dr. Randall Alexander, a pediatrician and director for 
the Center for Child Abuse at Morehouse University. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1280, In. 1 p. 1287,1. 
23.) Dr. Alexander testified that rib fractures would be seen in about 25-30% of shaken baby 
cases. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1309, In. 18 - p. 1310, In. 2.) He further testified that long bone fractures 
are not a hallmark of shaken baby syndrome. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1310, In. 11-15.) 
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Dr. Alexander echoed Dr. Crawford's testimony that the brain swelling may have caused 
some of the retinal hemolThages but not all of them. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1314, In. 19 - p. 1315, In. 
21.) He opined that Casey was the victim of shaken impact syndrome, a subset of shaken baby 
syndrome, which includes an impact. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1310, In. 24 p.1311, In. 10.) He also 
believed that Casey did not suffer the global constellation of injuries as a result of a fall down 
the stairs. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1312, In. 25 - p. 1314, In. 18.) At the same time, Dr. Alexander 
recognized the debate on a few issues involving shaken baby syndrome. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1334, In. 
7-14.) And, he admitted that he was unaware ofthe amount of force it would take to fracture 
the occipital bone of an II-month old. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1346, In. 19 - p. 1347, In. 17.) Dr. 
Alexander also stated that a severe cerebral edema could result from an impact alone. (Tr. Vol. 
II, p. 1361, In. 21 p. 1363, In. 1.) 
The state's next hired expert was Dr. Wilbur Smith, a pediatric radiologist. (Tr. Vol. II, 
p. 1372, In. 4 - p. 1378, In. 20.) Dr. Smith testified that he reviewed Casey's medical records 
including the CAT scans and X -rays and reviewed photographs of the stairs at the Stevens 
residence. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1378, In. 21 p. 1379, In. 10.) Dr. Smith opined that Casey suffered a 
very severe and violent shaking with severe impact to his head during or at the end of the 
shaking. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1379, In. 20 - p. 1381, In. 12.) Contrary to other witnesses, Dr. Smith 
testified that Casey had a diastatic (spread apart) fracture. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1395, In. 3 - p. 1399, 
In. 9.) Dr. Smith recalled personally only seeing a skull fracture the magnitude of Casey's on 
three occasions, two in abuse cases, and one in a severe car accident. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1405, In. 20 
- p. 1406, In 7.) Dr. Smith opined that the constellation of injuries he saw could not have 
OCCUlTed from falling down the stairs and hitting the hardwood floor. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1406, In. 
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12-20.) He testitied that Casey's injuries were consistent with a blow on the side of a bathtub. 
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 1410, In. 20 -- p. 1411, In. 2.) 
The state's next witness was Dr. Saami Shaibani, a "clinical professor of physics" for 
"[a]bout seven years now ... affiliated with Temple University." (Tr. Vol. II, p.1507, In.3-20.) 
Shaibani said he was a specialist in "injury mechanisms analysis" which he described as 
combining the "study of physics, trauma, and engineering to determine whether or not an injury 
could have been caused by the circumstances involved." (Tr. p. 1507, In. 23 - p. 1508, In. 7.) 
His medical training was "on the job" while at Oxford collaborating with medical professionals. 
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 1509, In. 16 p. 1510, In. 4.) Dr. Shaibani opined that he did not see any 
potential for Casey receiving a fatal head injury falling down the stairs or falling from a standing 
position. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1550, In. 12 p. 1552, In. 23.) 
Dr. Lawrence Thibault is a bioengineer with an extensive background in studying head 
injuries. He helped create the Injury Research Institute in Philadelphia, and had been a 
professor of bioengineering, neurosurgery and orthopedic surgery and a research engineer. (Tr. 
Vol. II, p. 1553, In. 9 p. 1559, In. 17.) Dr. Thibault had performed about 8,000 autopsies, and 
about 100 per year on infants, and was "the head injury person for the NFL and developed a 
technique to assess the degree of severity of concussion, head injury to players." (Tr. Vol. II, p. 
1565, In. 24 - p. 1567, In. 24.) 
Dr. Thibualt testified that, "There's never been an autopsy ever demonstrated by anyone 
in the world that showed retinal hemorrhages in a child without [intracranial pressure] changes." 
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 1584, In. 5-12.) Dr. Thibault testified that he disagreed with testimony 
suggesting that a rotational force or shearing force can cause retinal hemorrhaging because the 
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forces necessary to cause such an injury would require all of the muscles of the eye to tear. (Tr. 
Vol. II, p. 1584, In. 10 - p. 1585, In. 4.) Dr. Thibault testified that shaking cannot produce 
macular folds, let alone be pathognomonic or highly suggestive of it. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1585, In. 
21 p. 1586, In. 15.) 
Dr. Thibault testified that the occipital bone on an II-month-old infant is about one and 
one-half millimeters thick. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1590, In. 24 - p. 1591, In.!.) Relying on a previous 
study, Dr. Thibault testified that subdural hematomas can occur from short distance falls, onto 
padded surfaces, without producing a fracture. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1592, In. 21 p. 1596, In. 10.) 
Dr. Thibault testified that a subdural hematoma in the interhemispheric portion of the brain was 
not, as Dr. Smith testified, highly suggestive of shaking. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1596, In. 11 p.1597, 
In. 17.) Based upon a study he did and his clinical experience, Dr. Thibault said that it was 
"confounding to [him] how anyone can relate a, quote, shaking event in the total absence of any 
cervical spine trauma" as Dr. Alexander had testified to. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1597, In. 18 p.1600, 
In. 10.) The autopsy report showed no evidence of any cervical spine injury on Casey. (Tr. Vol. 
II, p. 1600, In. 11-15.) 
Dr. Thibault believed that both of Casey's subdural hematomas, the one at the front of 
the brain and the one at the back, were caused by an impact. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1604, In. 7 p. 
1605, In. 24.) Dr. Thibault also opined that Casey's skull fracture could have been caused by a 
stair fall. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1606, In. 20-24.) In fact, his own son fractured his skull falling from a 
dressing table at six months of age. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1606, In. 25 - p. 1607, In. 15.) 
Dr. Thibault testified that a cerebral edema is not caused by a fracture but rather, it is the body 
trying to send fluids to the region of injury to repair the cells and remove some of the bad 
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materials. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1607, In. 16 - p. 1608, In.14.) And, he testified that intracranial 
pressure "absolutely" leads to retinal hemorrhaging. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1608, In. 23-25.) Dr. 
Thibault agreed that intracranial pressure can lead to cardiac arrest when the brain stem 
herniates into the medulla and that is what he believed happened to Casey. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1608, 
In. 14 - p. 1609, In. 2.) Finally, Dr. Thibault opined that a standing height fall can produce a 
fracture for an toddler. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1620, In. 20-22.) 
The defense called Dr. Richard Reimann, a professor of physics at Boise State 
University. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1766, In. 25 - p. 1768, In. 14. He calculated that if Casey fell back 
from a standing fall, his head would impact at eight miles per hour. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1791, In.16 -
p. 1792, In. 25.) If Casey fell from an eight-inch rise, his head would have impacted the surface 
at about 9 miles per hour. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1793, In. 1 - p. 1794, In. 6.) Dr. Reimann opined that 
Casey's history of sliding down the stairs on his stomach could factor into his calculations 
theorizing that he could have slid, caught his feet and rotated over backwards hitting his head at 
any where from between 8 and 12 miles per hour. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1794, In. 14 - p. 1798, In. 8.) 
The defense's last expert was Dr. John Plunkett, the medical and laboratory director at 
Virginia Hospital in Hastings, Minnesota, who, among other things, wrote the Death 
Investigation Guidelines for the Minnesota coroners and medical examiners when investigating 
deaths of infants under the age of two. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1930, In. 3 - p. 1394, In. 4.) Dr. Plunkett 
also has a background in physics and is an instructor in the subject area of physics of falls. (Tr. 
Vol. II, p. 1937, In. 6 - p. 1938, In. 15.) 
Dr. Plunkett, who has performed over 2,000 autopsies in his life, examined the materials 
related Casey's death. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1935, In. 19 - p. 1937, In. 7.) He opined that short 
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distance falls can cause retinal hemorrhages. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1961, In. 3 - p. 1963, In. 11.) Dr. 
Plunkett opined that Casey's subdural hematomas were caused by "angular deceleration at the 
moment it struck a solid surface and stopped." (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1963, In. 12 - p. 1966, In. 18.) 
He testified that no one knows how retinal hemorrhages are caused; there are a lot of opinions 
and research, but no one knows for sure. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1973, In. 4-14.) There is, however, a 
relationship between retinal hemorrhages and blunt force trauma; in his experience, retinal 
hemorrhages occur 100% of the time when there is a subdural hematoma; the literature suggests 
they occur in only 50-60% of the cases, but he believes the literature is flawed because it does 
not differentiate between acute hematomas (within 48-72 hours of admittance to the hospital) or 
subacute hematomas (72 hours to ten days before admittance). (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1973, In. 15 - p. 
1974, In. 15.) Dr. Plunkett further opined that "[ s ]udden increases in intracranial pressure may 
cause retinal hemorrhages." (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1977, In. 10-23.) He also opined that macular folds 
are common where you have a high angular or rotational deceleration injury with an impact but 
not when there is a gradual increase in intracranial pressure. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1978, In. 13 p. 
1979, In. 11.) Furthermore, he testified that subarachnoid hemorrhages can be caused by, or 
aggravated by, increased intracranial pressure. (Tr. Vol. II p. 1993, In. 14 - p. 1996, In. 3) In 
his experience, closed head injuries can cause a rapid decrease in body temperature; Dr. Plunkett 
had witnessed a case where the patient's body temperature was as low as 90 degrees Fahrenheit 
about twenty minutes after the injury, although he does not understand the mechanism. (Tr. 
Vol. II, p. 1994, In. 4 p. 1996, In. 1.) Finally, Dr. Plunkett opined that from a standing height 
one or two steps up from the floor at the bottom of the stairs, if Casey fell and his head struck 
first, his occipital bone could be fractured. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 2002, In. 5 - p. 2003, In. 21.) 
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(f) Summary 
There were no eyewitnesses. Mr. Stevens did not confess. To the contrary, he directly 
and consistently denied hurting Casey, but made some ambiguous remarks while under the stree 
of seeing Casey die. He voluntarily waived his ~Miranda rights and cooperated with the police 
investigation. While some people thought he was acting strangely after Casey's injury, other 
people thought he was acting appropriately. Some testified to inappropriate moments of 
parenting while others testified that Mr. Stevens was a loving and tender care giver and father 
figure. The experts disagreed on whether the injuries found could have been caused in the 
manner consistently related by Mr. Stevens. 
Mr. Stevens was found guilty of first degree murder by committing aggravated battery 
on a child under twelve years of age. I.e. § 18-4003(d). He filed a Notice of Appeal and then a 
Motion for a New Trial. The motion for new trial was denied and both the conviction and the 
denial of the new trial motion were affirmed by this Court. State v. Stevens, supra. 
2. Documentary and Testimonial Evidence in the Post-Conviction Proceedings 
As noted, the district court permitted some of the issues to proceed to evidentiary 
hearing. The court then permitted both sides to present evidence by deposition and affidavit in 
addition to sworn testimony. The evidence pertaining to the issues on appeal is set forth 
separately below. 
D. The Court's Written Ruling 
After the hearing, the court issued a Decision Following Evidentiary Hearing. CR 2355. 
In short, the court denied all the remaining claims in the petition. The court's findings and 
conclusions as to particular issues are set forth separately below. 
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A timcly Notice of Appeal was filed. CR 2384. 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. Did the Strickland claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the 
judge disqualification issue on appeal present a genuine issue of material fact requiring 
an evidentiary hearing? 
B. Did the Court err in denying the Brady claim? 
1. Was the court's conclusion that the Petitioner had not proved that Casey's 
eyes were removed after the autopsy unreasonable as there was not substantial 
evidence in the record to support it, particularly in light of the assistant 
mortician's testimony that the eyes were present during the embalming? 
2. Did Mr. Stevens prove by a preponderance the other elements of the Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), claim? 
c. Did the court err in denying the Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), claim 
regarding trial counsels' failure to find the Mortuary Embalming Report? 
1. Did the court err when it concluded it was not deficient perfonnance to not locate the 
report? 
2. Was Mr. Stevens prejudiced by trial counsels' failure? 
D. Did the court err in denying the Strickland claim regarding trial counsels' failure to locate 
and present evidence regarding the effects ofPropulsid? 
1. Was the court's conclusion that trial counsel made a strategic decision to not 
investigate and then present evidence regarding the effect of Propulsid on the decedent an 
unreasonable finding of fact as there was not substantial evidence in the record to support 
it, particularly as lead trial counsel specifically testified the failure to investigate and 
present the evidence was not a strategic decision? 
2. Was Mr. Stevens prejudiced by trial counsels' failure? 
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E. Did the court err in denying the Strickland claim regarding trial counsels' failure to consult 
with a pediatric radiologist? 
1. Did the trial court err in concluding that it was not deficient performance for trial 
counsel to fail to consult a radiologist about the timing of the head injuries and the size of 
the skull fracture, particularly in light of the strong emphasis put upon the large size of the 
fracture during trial and at sentencing and when the evidence shows that the fracture was 
actually 2-3 cm instead of the 8 12 cm claimed by the state? 
2. Was Mr. Stevens prejudiced by trial counsels' failure? 
F. Did the court err in determining that the cumulative effect of trial counsels' deficient 
performance was not enough to show prejudice under Strickland? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The Court Erred When it Summarily Dismissed the Ineffective Assistance of Appellate 
Counsel Claim Because there was a Material Question of Fact Whether Appellate 
Counsel's Performance was Deficient 
1. Facts Pertaining to Argument 
In November of2000, after sentencing in the criminal case, presiding District Court Judge 
Eismann was elected to the Idaho Supreme Court. When the motion for a new trial was filed on 
June 13,2001, Justice Eismann had already taken office and the matter was assigned to District 
Judge Darla Williamson, Justice Eismann's successor in office. See CR 1084. However, the case 
was later reassigned by order of this Court to Justice Eismann, who was then a sitting Supreme 
Court Justice. Mr. Stevens' attorneys filed an objection to the assignment of Justice Eismann in 
this Court. See CR 1092. They also filed a Notice of Objection to Assignment of Judge and a 
Motion to Disqualify or in the Alternative Motion for Recusal arguing that Justice Eismann was 
not constitutionally eligible to sit as a District Court Judge. CR 1104-1111. The motion to 
disqualify was denied. In doing so "Acting District Judge" Eismannnoted that a similar motion 
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had been brought before this Court and was rejected. CR 1148. Mr. Stevens then brought a 
motion to reconsider arguing that the procedure by which Justice Eismann was assigned violated 
ID Const. Article V, § 12. Justice Eismann then filed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
stating that he was appointed to preside over the case "by the Idaho Supreme Court on a vote of 4-
0." CR 1182. 
The denial ofMr. Stevens' challenge to the assignment of Justice Eismann was not raised 
as an issue on appeal. After Justice Eismann's denial of the new trial motion was affirmed on 
appeal, Mr. Stevens raised an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim in his post-
conviction petition. The claim was based upon the fact that appellate counsel did not raise the 
issue that Justice Eismann was constitutionally ineligible to serve as a district judge during the 
new trial proceedings. CR 22-23. The state did not deny the factual allegations supporting the 
claim in its Answer. CR 319-20. It did file a Motion for Summary Dismissal arguing that the 
claim was "bare and conclusory" and that Mr. Stevens had failed to show how appellate counsel's 
failure "would have ultimately affected the outcome of the case." CR 433. 
Mr. Stevens objected to the state's motion and argued that the claim was meritorious. CR 
454-456. The district court dismissed the claim writing, 
The Idaho Supreme Court assigned Justice Eismann to hear Stevens' direct appeal. 
Stevens asked the Supreme Court to rescind the assignment, but the Court did not. 
Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief, ~ 150-152. The Supreme Court in its inherent 
power has the ultimate administrative authority in the judicial assignment. The 
State's Motion to Dismiss this claim is therefore granted. 
CR 1780. 
Mr. Stevens then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Alter or Amend. CR 1784. 
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He argued in support of the motion that "there [wa]s no authority cited by the State or in the 
Decision and Order permitting the Supreme Court to assign a constitutionally ineligible person to 
sit as a judge of the district court. A conclusion that there is inherent authority to do so would 
require this Court, in a different case, to rule that the Supreme Court could appoint anyone to sit 
as a District Judge .... Mr. Stevens respectfully submits such an interpretation allows 
for obviously absurd results and should not be adopted by this Court." CR 1788. 
The district court denied the motion stating that "[t]he issue Stevens claims his appellate 
counsel should have raised on appeal, was already decided by the Supreme Court. Appellate 
counsel is therefore not ineffective for failing to raise on direct appeal that which was already 
decided. Furthermore, this court has no power to overrule a Supreme Court order." CR 1806. 
2. Why Relief Should be Granted 
As the state admitted in the Answer, there was no factual dispute about the following: 
149. At the motion for new trial, Mr. Stevens filed an objection to the designation 
of Supreme Court Justice Daniel Eismann to preside over the motion. 
150. Mr. Stevens also filed a Motion to Disqualify or in the Alternative Motion 
for Recusal seeking to have Justice Eismann removed from the case. 
151. Mr. Stevens also attempted to have the Supreme Court rescind the 
assignment of Justice Eismann. 
152. The Idaho Supreme Court did not rescind the order of assignment. 
153. Mr. Stevens's Motion for Disqualification was denied by Justice Eismann. 
154. Appellate counsel did not raise this issue on appeal. 
Compare, CR 22-23, (Petition p. 15-16) and CR 319-20, (Answer, p. 49). 
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Thus, the only issue before the district court was the truth of the allegation in Paragraph 
155: "Had the issue been raised, the Supreme Court would have vacated the denial of the new trial 
motion due to the improper assignment of Justice Eismann." CR 23. But, as demonstrated below, 
there is no doubt that Paragraph 155 is conect. 
Justice Eismann, as a sitting Supreme Court Justice, was not constitutionally eligible to 
preside as a District Court Judge. Aliicle V, § 11 of the Idaho Constitution requires that the State 
be divided into judicial districts, "for each of which a judge shall be chosen by the qualified 
electors thereofI.]" At the time of the new trial motion, Justice Eismann was not a district judge 
elected by the voter of either Ada County or the Fourth Judicial District. Rather, he had resigned 
his district court judgeship to take his cunent position on the Idaho Supreme Court.3 
The only exceptions to Article V, § 11 IS requirement of an elected (or one appointed by the 
Governor) district judge appears in Article V, § 12, which states that "[a] judge of any district 
court, or any retired justice of the Supreme Court or any retired district judge, maya hold a district 
court in any county at the request of the judge of the district court thereofI.]" But, as is manifest 
from the quoted language above, Justice Eismann did not possess the constitutional qualifications 
to sit as an assigned district court jUdge. He was not a "judge of any district court." He was not a 
"retired district court judge" and he was not a "retired justice of the Supreme Court." Therefore, 
he was not permitted to sit as a judge of the district court under Article V of the Idaho 
Constitution. 
3 As the Court's website points out, "[i]n 2000, the people ofIdaho elected Justice 
Eismann to the Idaho Supreme Court, where he began serving on January 2,2001." 
http://www.isc.idaho.gov/problem-solving/eismann. 
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An objection in the district court followed by an appeal was the only method by which Mr. 
Stevens could challenge Justice Eismann's constitutionally invalid appointment. The motion filed 
by Mr. Stevens' counsel in this Court was brought without original jurisdiction under Article Y, § 
9 (and I.e. § 1-203), as it was not a writ of review (authorized by I.e. § 7-202), a writ of mandate 
(I.e. § 7-302), a writ of prohibition (I.e. § 7-401), or a writ of habeas corpus (I.e. § 19-4202). 
Nor was it a proceeding in the nature of a quo warranto action, which must be brought in the 
district court and then only by a prosecuting attorney, the Attorney General, or the person who 
claims to be entitled to the office being unlawfully held. I.C. § 6-602; see Toncray v. Budge, 14 
Idaho 621, 95 P. 26 (1908). Thus, no inference can be drawn from this Court's denial ofMr. 
Stevens' motion in this Court because it was no doubt denied for procedural rather than 
substantive reasons. See State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 41, 266 P .3d 1146, 1152 (2011) 
(" Jurisdictional questions are fundamental issues that this Court must address regardless of 
whether the parties themselves have raised them."), citing State v. Hartwig, 150 Idaho 326, 328, 
246 P .3d 979, 981 (2011). The district court's comment that this Court had "already decided" the 
issue is not correct because the Court could not have ruled on the merits of the claim not properly 
before it. 4 
Had appellate counsel challenged the assignment of Justice Eismann on appeal, this Court 
would have considered the issue and would have held that Justice Eismann was not eligible to 
hear the new trial motion. The plain language of Article Y, §§ 11 and 12 forbids a sitting Justice 
4 Even if the Court had reached the merits, its decision would have been dicta due to the 
lack of jurisdiction, and the law of the case doctrine would have been inapplicable. See Swanson 
v. Swanson, 134 Idaho 512, 515, 5 P.3d 973, 976 (2000) (law of the case doctrine does not apply 
unless the Supreme Court "states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the 
decision[.]"). 
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from presiding in the district court. "[G]enerally, the statutory rules of construction apply to the 
interpretation of constitutional provisions." Leavitt v. Craven, No. 40021, 2012 WL 2053762 *5 
(Idaho June 8, 2012); see also Lewis v. Woodall, 72 Idaho 16,236 P.2d 91, 93 (1951). And when 
interpreting statutes, the Court "begins with the literal words of a statute, which are the best guide 
to determining legislative intent." St. Luke's Magic Valley Reg'! jUed. Ctr., Ltd. v. Bd. o/Cnty. 
Comm'rs a/Gooding Cnty., 149 Idaho 584, 593, 237 P.3d 1210, 1219 (2010) (citing Doe v. Boy 
Scouts of America, 148 Idaho 427, 430,224 P.3d 494,497 (2009)). Thus, when interpreting 
constitutional provisions, this Court also begins with the literal words of the provision. See also, 
State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 732 (2008). For example, in Leavitt, the Court 
relied upon the plain language of Article IV, § 7 and held that the provision did not require the 
Commission on Pardons and Parole to hold open sessions when deciding to deny clemency 
petitions finding no "textual basis" to infer such a requirement. Supra, at *6. Here, the plain 
language of Article V, § 12 does not permit a sitting Supreme Court Justice from presiding over a 
district court and this Court, had it been presented with a properly raised challenge on appeal, 
would have so held. 
In addition, the fact that the provision includes a list of specific persons eligible to sit as a 
district court judge while it omits sitting Supreme Court Justices shows the latter were intended to 
be excluded from the list. "In other words, the specific mention of one thing implies the exclusion 
of another; expressio unius est exclusio alterius." State v. Michael, III Idaho 930, 933, 729 P.2d 
405,408 (1986), citing Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U.S. 1,22 (1898). That being 
the case, this COUl1 would have vacated the order denying the new trial motion and remanded for 
further proceedings had the issue been raised on appeal. 
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Even if the language of Article V, § 12 was ambiguous, the available legislative history 
shows that the provision was not intended to allow sitting Supreme Court Justices to sit in the 
district court. When the provision was adopted at the Constitutional Convention, it did not permit 
either retired district judges or retired Supreme Court Justices to hold district court. The original 
provision, adopted in 1889, provided that a "judge of any district court may hold a district court in 
any county at the request of the judge of the district court thereof; and upon the request of the 
governor, it shall be his duty to do so[.]" However, in 1966, the people approved 1965 Senate 
Joint Resolution No.7, which added the language authorizing retired district court judges and 
retired Supreme Court Justices to also hold district court upon request. Prior to the election, the 
Secretary of State published in local newspapers a summary of the proposed Constitutional 
Amendments to be voted upon along with the "Attorney General's Statement of Meaning and 
Purpose" of each proposed amendment on the ballot. The Attorney General's interpretation of the 
relevant section of S.J.R. 7 was that "[t]his proposed amendment, if approved, would authorize 
any District Judge, any retired District Judge, or any retired Justice of the Supreme Court to hold 
court in any District Court at the request of either the Judge of that District Court, the Governor, 
or the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court." (Publication attached hereto as Appendix A.) 
Likewise, the members of the Senate Judiciary, Rules and Administration Committee were 
informed that S.J.R. No.7 proposed "an Amendment to the Constitution whereby retired Supreme 
Court Justices and retired District Judges could hold court." (Minutes attached hereto as 
Appendix B.) 
Thus, the Legislature did not believe SJ.R. 7 would permit sitting Supreme Court Justices 
to hold district court and the Attorney General agreed with that interpretation. There is no reason 
to believe that Idaho voters held a different interpretation of the proposed amendment when they 
voted to approve it, especially as the plain language of the amended constitutional provision does 
not permit a sitting Supreme Court Justice to hold district court. Consequently, this Court erred in 
assigning Justice Eismann to preside over Mr. Stevens's new trial motion and would have so held 
had the issue been presented to it on direct appeal. 
3. Conclusion 
In light of the above, it was deficient performance on the part of appellate counsel to fail to 
raise this issue and that failure prejudiced Mr. Stevens. Consequently, a prima facie case of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel under Strickland was pleaded and the Court erred by 
failing to grant an evidentiary hearing on the claim. 
B. The State Violated Petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment Right to Due Process of Law by 
Failing to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence Prior to Trial as Required by Brady v. Maryland, 373 
U.S. 83 (1963) 
1. Facts Pertaining to Argument 
(a) Allegations in pleadings 
Mr. Stevens alleged that Casey Whitesides' eyes were not removed at the autopsy, but had 
been removed post-embalming, as they were still present when the Mortuary Embalming Report 
was created. As noted above, the condition of the eyes was an important element of the state's 
case. As will be discussed below, Mr. Stevens alleged that trial counsel should have discovered 
the Mortuary Embalming Repoli prior to trial. He also alleged that the state's failure to disclose 
those facts was a Brady violation. In this regard, his petition alleged: 
21. At trial, expert witnesses testified that the combination of macular folding, 
perineural hemorrhages and the severity, frequency, and locations of retinal 
hemorrhages in Casey's eyes were indicative of shaken baby syndrome. 
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22. After trial, Glen Elam, an investigator for Stevens's public defender, contacted 
a prosecutor in the case and raised the issue of whether Casey's eyes were removed 
before or after his body was embalmed. 
23. A prosecutor, Jan Bennetts, then had a detective investigate this issue. 
24. The detective, Jim Miller, found that most people could not remember when 
Casey's eyes were removed, but the Mortuary Embalming Report showed that the 
person who performed the embalming noted Casey's eyes were brown. 
25. This evidence suggests that Casey's eyes were removed after his body was 
embalmed because, to make this observation, Casey's eyes had to be in his body. 
26. Detective Jim Miller and his brother, Detective Joe Miller, both recall Casey's 
eyes being collected a day or two after his death, while his body was at the funeral 
home. 
l37. The evidence regarding the post-embalming examination of Casey's eyes is 
exculpatory. 
138. Dr. Robert Slaughter knew that the eyes had been removed post-embalming. 
139. Coroner Erwin Sonnenberg knew the eyes had been removed 
post-embalming 
because he directed Dr. Slaughter to remove them. 
140. Dr. Slaughter and Mr. Sonnenberg were both part of the law enforcement 
team in this case. 
141. Detective Jim Miller recalls that the eyes were collected at the funeral home. 
142. Detective Joe Miller also recalls the eyes were collected at the funeral home. 
143. The detectives were part of the law enforcement team in this case. 
144. It is unknown whether the prosecution was ever informed of the 
post-embalming removal of the eyes prior to trial. 
145. However, at the preliminary hearing prosecutor Jan Bennetts referred to a 
postautopsy procedure where the eyes were removed. 
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146. The prosecution either knew that the eyes were removed post-autopsy 
because it was informed by someone with personal knowledge or it should have 
known thc cycs wcre removed post-embalming because of the Mortuary 
Em balming Report. 
147. Petitioner's trial counsel David Leroy filed a request for discovery. 
148. The prosecuting attorney never specifically informed defense counsel about 
the eyes being removcd post-autopsy. 
CR 10-11; 21-22. The state in its Answer admitted Paragraphs 21-26, 141, 142, 143, and 
147 and denied Paragraphs 137-140, 144-146, and 148. CR276-277;318-319. 
After the evidentiary hearing, the trial court made findings of fact and conclusions oflaw 
rcgarding this claim. First, the court found that the following facts were undisputed: 
1. Casey died on December 28, 1996, and his autopsy was scheduled for 8 a.m., 
December 29, 1996. 
2. Casey's autopsy was performed by Dr. Slaughter at St. Luke's. Detective Jim Miller, 
Sergeant Gene Trakel and Dave Sherner attended the autopsy. 
3. At approximately 11:45 a.m., Ken Hestead took Casey's body to Dakan Funeral Chapel 
(Dakan). 
4. From 12:30-2:30 p.m., Casey's body was embalmed by Mr. Reinke at Dakan. 
5. Mr. Reinke's embalming report notes that Casey's eyes are brown. 
6. Casey's body was at Dakan all day on December 30. The viewing was scheduled for 5 
p.m., December 31. 
7. Between 1 :30 and 3 p.m. on December 31, mortician Paul Kerr took Cascy from Dakan 
to St. Luke's for a long-bone x-ray. The x-ray took approximately 15-20 minutes, and Mr. 
Kerr remained outside the x-ray room the whole time. Mr. Kerr testified that Casey's body 
looked the same before the x-rays as it did after. 
8. Mr. Kerr then returned to Dakan with Casey's body to prepare it for viewing. Mr. Kerr 
was unable to prepare Cascy's body in time, and thc viewing had to be postponed until 
January 1, 1997. 
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9. Sometime between 8:00 a.m., Deccmber 29 and December 31, Casey's eyes were 
removed and tissue samples were taken from his face. 
CR 2364. 
Second, it concluded that "Stevens has failed to show the prosecutor had actual knowledge 
that Casey's eyes were allegedly removed post-embalming." CR 2365. Third, it concluded that 
"Stevens has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the eyes were removed post-
embalming." CR 2369. From that, the court concluded that "the alleged evidence could not have 
been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently" and denied the Brady claim. ld. 
However, as shown below, the evidence did show that the eycs were removed post-
embalming, that fact was known by a member of thc law enforcement team, and that fact was 
withheld from Mr. Stevens. 
(b) Evidence regarding the removal of the eyes 
In 2003, after being contacted by prosecutor Jan Bennetts, Detective Jim Miller conducted 
an investigation and wrote a report. The September 4,2003, report was admitted as an attachment 
to Petitioner's Exhibit U. It states in part: 
8-18-03 
I had a very limited independent recollection of these events. I attended Casey's 
autopsy and I don't remember the eyes being removed or any tissue samples being 
taken from his face. I remember Casey's eyes being collected a day or two later 
while he was at the funeral home. I told Jan I would review my notes to see if! 
made any regarding these issues. 
I reviewed my handwritten case notes and found the following notations: 
12-30-96, 1520 hrs, I called Dakan Funeral Chapel 459-3629 and was advised Casey's 
services will be on 1-1-97 at 1 100 hrs 
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1730 hrs (approx.) Joe Miller spcaks with Irwin Sonnenberg; Casey's eyes have 
bccn taken, he will check on long bone x-rays being done. 
I spoke to Detective Joe Miller who was involved in the investigation of Casey's 
death. He remcmbcrs Casey's eyes being collected after the autopsy. He thought 
there had been at least one trip made to Dakan's Funeral Chapel by the coroner's 
office to collect Casey's eyes and the tissue samples. Detective Miller told me he 
thought Doug Tucker, from the coroner's office, may have bcen the one who went 
out to Dakan. 
8-19-03 
There is a Mortuary Embalming Report that was filled out by Doug Reinke. This 
form indicates Casey died on 12-28-96 at 1038 hrs. Casey's body was received at 
Dakan Funeral Chapel on 12-29-96 at 1230 hrs. The embalming process started 
twenty-six to twenty-eight hours after Casey's death, which would be about 1230 
hrs. Doug Reinke told me the embalming process takes about two hours. That 
would indicate Casey's body was embalmed from about 1230 to 1430 hrs on 12-
29-96. 
I further examined the Mortuary Embalming Report. Under the "Description of 
Subject" section on the top of page one, Doug Reinke notes Casey's eyes are 
brown. Reinke could not note this if his eyes were not present. He further makes 
notes there are, "bruises on forehead around eye." 
8-22-03 
I called and spoke to Ada County Coroner Irwin [sic] Sonneberg. I asked him 
about the collection of Casey's eyes and the tissue samples. Sonnenberg told me 
he does not remember anyone from his office going to Dakan to collect these 
items. 
8-25-03 
I called and spoke to Doug Tucker from the Ada County Coroner's Office. I asked 
him ifhe had any memory of collecting Casey's eyes or the tissue samples. Tucker 
told me he himself has never collected the eyes from a body. 
38 
8-27-03 
I spoke to Lieutenant Gene Trakel, who attended Casey's autopsy with me. He 
does not remember Casey's eyes being removed during the autopsy while we were 
there. 
Exhibit U, attachment, p. 1-6. Further, Detective Jim Miller testified at the evidentiary hcaring 
that "it was my first autopsy, and I believe that if! was present when the eyes were taken from his 
body I would have remembercd that." (TrPCP, p. 487, In. 12-14.)5 
While Detective Jim Miller and Lt. Trakel do not remember the eyes being taken at the 
autopsy, Doug Reinke recalls them being in situ when he filled out the Mortuary Embalming 
RepOli. Mr. Reinke is a professional mortician who embalmed Casey's remains on December 29, 
1996. (TrPCP p. 354, In. 15-17.) Prior to embalming, he did a physical examination of Casey's 
body and noted its condition on his Embalming Report. Mr. Reinke noted Casey's eyes were 
brown and testified that he could only know that "[b]y seeing them[.]" (TrPCP, p. 355, In. 22.) 
(The Embalming Report is attached to Petitioner's Exhibit U.) Mr. Reinke, also testified that he 
would not have mistaken a cotton ball or prosthesis for a real eye. 
Q. Could you have mistaken any of these items that would be placed in the eye 
socket with a real eye? 
A. I wouldn't know under what circumstances I would do that. It would not be a 
brown color typically. 
TrPCP, p. 359, In. 22 - p. 356, In. 2.) 
5 Indeed, Dr. Slaughter'S 2004 new trial motion testimony about how eyes are removed 
confirms Det. Miller's impression that it is something no one would ever forget. See Plaintiffs 
Exhibit X (transcript of August 24,2004 proceedings), p. 41, In. 14 - p. 42, In. 8 (Using a ten 
inch long implement, the doctor "[r]emove[d] the eyes from the front by moving them and using 
blunt dissection with curved needles to carefully go back behind, cut the optic nerve and come 
out the other way.") 
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On cross-examination, Mr. Reinke testified the eye cap typically used by Dakan was a 
flesh color with a shade of pink and that he "just couldn't see" how he could have mistaken an eye 
cap for an eye. (TrPCP p. 362, In. 22 - p. 363, In. 24; see Respondent's Exhibit 216 (photocopy of 
typical eye cap)). In addition, there is no testimony that a prosthetic eye or eye cap was used 
during the autopsy. To the contrary, Mr. Sonnenberg testified: 
Q. Did you see Dr. Slaughter put any sort of an eye blocker into Casey's eyes? 
A. I don't know that we've ever done that. 
Q. Never put that in their eyes? 
A. To my knowledge, no. 
Q. Have you ever seen that be put in someone's eyes, like a blocker of some sort? 
A. We don't. The Lion's Eye Bank, when they remove them for enucleation, they will. 
Q. What was put in Casey's eyes after they were removed? 
A. I don't know that we would have put anything in it in the morgue. There wouldn't 
have been any reason for us to. 
(TrPCP p. 435, In. 19 - p. 436, In. 2; p. 437, In. 4-8.) Thus, there is no evidence to support a 
finding that Mr. Reinke mistook a pink eye cap for a brown eye. 
As the embalming took place immediately after Mr. Reinke noted the presence of the 
eyes, the eyes had to have been removed post-embalming. This is further confirmed because, Mr. 
Reinke did not note any cuts on Casey's face prior to embalming, TrPCP p. 580, In. 9-10, but Paul 
Kerr, who prepared the body for viewing, had to try and repair the damage done by tissue samples. 
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Mr. Kerr first noticed there were tissue sample cuts on Casey's face on the morning of 
December 31, as he "went to prepare Casey's body for viewing" later that day. (TrPCP p. 382, In. 
6-8.) Mr. Kerr explained that these samples must have been taken the day before: 
They were still very moist and fresh. Had they been done 24 or 48 hours earlier, 
we would have had time to prepare those and get those dried out a bit. And I just 
remember being very challenged and rushed in getting those incisions dried out in 
order to make it to the time of the viewing, which I wasn't able to accomplish. 
(TrPCP p. 382, In. 15-24.) Of course, the wounds would have been dry had the samples been 
taken at the autopsy because that took place two days prior, on the morning of December 29. See 
Petitioner's Exhibit V (Final Autopsy Report). 
Thus, the most likely time for the eyes to have been removed is December 30, 1996. The 
autopsy was completed and Casey was embalmed on December 29 and Casey was not prepared 
for the viewing until the 31 SI. While there is no direct evidence that anyone from the coroner's 
office went to Dankan's on 12/30, the fact the eyes were removed on that date is shown by the 
conversation between Detective Joe Miller and Mr. Sonnenberg at 5:30 p.m. on 12/30. Miller 
Report (9/4/2003), p. 5, attached to Plaintiff's Exhibit U ("17:30 hrs, Det. Joe Miller talks to Irwin 
[sic] Sonnenberg, who advises Casey's eyes have been taken."). This shows that Mr. Sonnenberg 
had the eyes removed on the 30lh and was reporting the same to the detective. See also, 
Petitioner's Exhibit Y (Miller Report (2/2111997), p. 13: "Detective Joe Miller spoke with Ada 
County Coroner, Erwin Sonnenberg. Det. Joe Miller was advised, the eyes from Casey 
Whitehead had been taken, and the Coroner would be checking on having a long bone x-ray done 
on Casey Whiteside." Joe Miller's brother, Jim Miller, was present at the autopsy and Jim did not 
recall the eyes being taken then. 
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Further, Dr. Slaughter, who performed the autopsy, never directly testifies that he removed 
the eyes at the autopsy. In fact, prosecutor Jan Bennett carefully avoided asking him that question 
at the preliminary hearing: 
Q. And Doctor after you completed the autopsy did you - were there documented 
retinal hemorrhages in Casey? 
A. Yes, I retrieved the eyes and sent them to the University of California at San 
Francisco where they were examined by an ophthalmologic pathologist who is a 
pathologist who specializes in looking at the eyes and he documented retina 
hemorrhages. 
Petitioner's Exhibit A, p. 96, In. 9-17 (emphasis added). At the first trial, the prosecutor did not 
ask Dr. Slaughter about the eyes during her direct examination. On cross-examination, he was 
asked: 
Q. Doctor did you remove Casey's eyes? 
A. I did. 
Q. For what purpose? 
A. The coroner had me remove them and keep them until they tell me what to do 
with them later. 
Exhibit B, p. 1125, In. 19-23. No mention of where or when the eyes were removed is made. 
At the second trial, Dr. Slaughter was asked by the same prosecutor: 
Q. Doctor, with regards to Casey's eyes, did you perform a procedure to remove 
Casey's eyes? 
A. Yes ..... 
Exhibit C, p. 411, In. 12-15. Again, Dr. Slaughter was not asked where or when this procedure 
occurred. Thus, there is no testimony from the person who claims to have removed the eyes about 
where or when the removal occurred. 
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Moreover, Dr. Slaughter testified during the new trial motion proceedings before Justice 
Eismann that he did not recall when he removed the eyes. Mr. Stevens's counsel, Elaine Sharp, 
directly asked the doctor: 
Q. You didn't remove the eyes during the autopsy, did you? 
A. Honestly, I don't remember the exact instant I removed the eyes. 
Q. Do you recall when you took the eyes? 
A. No. I do not. 
Petitioner's Exhibit X, p. 40, In. 3-6; p. 41, In. 8-10. 
In addition, the doctor testified that it was not standard for him to remove the eyes at the 
autopsy, saying that "[i]t's not something we normally do." Exhibit D, p. 42, In. 10-11. Mr. 
Sonneberg also testified it was not standard procedure to remove a child's eyes during autopsies, 
even in suspected homicide case. (TrPCP p. 652, In. 19 - p. 653, In. 6.) If the standard procedure 
were followed, the eyes would not have been removed. (Thus, it is apparent that during his 
testimony at the new trial proceedings, Dr. Slaughter merely assumed that he removed them at the 
autopsy without having an independent recollection of doing so. Exhibit X, p. 56, In. 4-13.) 
Moreover, the doctor described the removal in a manner inconsistent with it being done at 
the autopsy. 
Q. You think you were assisted in the removal of the eyes by a histopathologist, 
histotechnologist? 
A. I'm not really sure. I have a vague recollection of removing the eyes, and it 
seems to me that someone else was in the room or with me. If it was someone who 
was helping me it would have been one of the histotechnologists. But it may have 
just been someone in the room. I don't remember. 
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Id, p. 55, In. 2-11. This testimony shows that the removal was post-autopsy because there were 
several people present at the autopsy, i. e., Dave Sherner from the coroner's office, who took the 
autopsy photographs, Detective Jim Miller and Lt. Gene Trakel, but no histotechnologist. TrPCr 
p. 695, In. 6-7; p. 645, In. 6-9. However, if the removal was at the funeral home, Dr. Slaughter 
might only have had a single assistant there, e.g., Erwin Sonnenberg, the only person in the 
coroner's office who was trained to remove eyes. (TrrCP p. 417, In. 25 - p. 418, In. 2.) (In this 
regard, it is worth noting that Justice Eismann heard Dr. Slaughter's testimony about removing the 
eyes three times, at the first and second trial as well as during the new trial proceedings but still 
found the embalming report as "very strong evidence that the eyes were present when Casey's 
body was embalmed." Petitioner's Exhibit E-6, p. 681 (Order Denying Motion for New Trial, p. 
12.)) 
The photographic evidence also shows that Casey's eyes were not removed at the autopsy. 
Trial counsel John DeFranco testified that he looked at every autopsy photograph provided in 
discovery and that none of them showed that Casey's eyes were removed. (TrPCP p. 729, In. 4-
10.) In addition, several autopsy photos were introduced at the criminal trial. State's Trial 
Exhibits 1-2,20-33,37-42. None of these photos show Casey with his eyes removed. Detective 
Jim Miller testified that he too took photographs at the autopsy, including ones taken after the 
skull cap had been removed and the brain examined and that none of the photographs show Casey 
with his eyes removed. (TrPCP p. 504, In. 24 - p. 505, In. 18.) 
While Mr. Sonnenberg testified that he believed he was at the autopsy, and that he 
believed the eyes were removed then, his belief is not based upon a specific recollection. 
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Q. Mr. Sonnenberg, you said that you would have been at the autopsy. Do you remember 
saying that? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Do you have a specific recollection of that, of being at the autopsy? 
A. No. 
(TrPCP p. 455, In. 19-25.) 
Moreover, there was evidence showing he was not present. First, Dr. Slaughter states that 
it was an assistant coroner who was present at the autopsy. At the preliminary hearing, he is asked 
about photos taken at the autopsy. 
Q. Dr. Slaughter, who took those? 
A. I believe it was the county coroner. 
Q. Mr. Sonnenberg? 
A. I can't remember which assistant took the pictures. 
Petitioner's Exhibit A, p. 80, In. 23 - p. 81, In. 2 (emphasis added). Thus, Dr. Slaughter testified 
that an assistant coroner, not Mr. Sonnenberg was present at the autopsy. That is corroborated by 
other testimony that Dave Shemer was present and took the photographs. (TrPCP p. 655, In 21-
24.) 
Second, Dr. Slaughter's recollection that an assistant was present is corroborated by the 
coroner's own files which show that Dave Shemer, a deputy coroner and the case investigator, 
took the photos. Plaintiffs Exhibit EE to the Sonnenberg deposition. (State's Exhibit 204.) ]n 
addition, Mr. Shemer's notes about who was present at the autopsy does not list Mr. Sonnenberg. 
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Plaintiffs Exhibit CC to the Sonnenberg deposition ("@ post mortem[:] Gene Trakel Sgt MPD[,] 
Jim Miller[,] Slaughter[,] me[.]"). 
Third, when Jim Miller asked Mr. Sonnenberg about when Casey's eyes and the face 
tissue samples were collected, Mr. Sonnenberg told the detective that "he does not remember 
anyone from his office going to Dakan to collect these items." Exhibit FF to Deposition of Erwin 
Sonnenberg (Respondent's Exhibit 204). (TrPCP p. 459, In. 25 - p. 460, In. 12.) IfMr. 
Sonnenberg had been at the autopsy and seen the eyes removed, he would have told the detective 
that no one from his office would have gone to Dakan because the eyes had been previously 
removed. His response that he did not recall anyone going to Dakan shows that Mr. Sonnenberg 
did not witness the autopsy. 
All the above shows that the eyes were taken after embalming on 12/29, but prior to the 
completion of the long bone survey on 12/31. However, if the eyes were not taken on the 30th, 
they must have been removed on 12/31 during the long bone survey as that was the only time 
prior to the viewing and burial when Casey's body was not in the custody of the funeral chapel. In 
either case, they were not removed during the autopsy. 
2. Why Relief Should be Granted 
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), holds that the suppression by the prosecution 
of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is 
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 
prosecution. The Brady doctrine has been expanded to include instances where the exculpatory 
evidence was never requested, or requested only in a general way. United States v. Bagley, 473 
U.S. 667, 682 (1985). In order to establish a Brady violation, only three things need be shown: 
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"The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or 
because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or 
inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued." Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 
(1999). Thus, constitutional error results when favorable evidence is withheld from the defendant 
"if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result 
of the proceedings would have been different." Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,437 (1995). 
A trial court's findings of fact are reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" standard. 
I.R.C.P.52(a). "Factual findings are not clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial and 
competent, although conflicting, evidence. Evidence is substantial if a reasonable trier of fact 
would accept it and rely on it." McCormick Int'l USA, Inc. v. Shore, 152 Idaho 920, 277 P.3d 367, 
370 (2012) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). This Court reviews a trial court's 
conclusions of law de novo. Id. Likewise, mixed questions of fact and law are also reviewed de 
novo. The Highlands, Inc. v. Hosac, 130 Idaho 67, 69, 936 P.3d 1309,1311 (1997). 
Not only did Mr. Stevens prove the eyes were removed post-autopsy, but the evidence 
shows that all three Brady requirements have been met. The next subsections show: a) there is 
not substantial evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that Mr. Stevens has not proved by 
a preponderance that the evidence that the eyes were removed post -autopsy; b) a member of the 
law enforcement team knew of the post-autopsy removal; c) that fact was not disclosed to Mr. 
Stevens; d) the evidence was both exculpatory and impeaching; and e) Mr. Stevens was 
prejudiced. Consequently, the court's legal conclusion that Brady v. Maryland had not been 
violated was in error and should be reversed. 
47 
(a) The court 'sfindings are illogical and not supported by the 
evidence 
While the trial court concluded that "the most logical explanation for the brown eyes 
notation on Mr. Reinke's embalming report is simple carelessness," CR 2369, the conclusion does 
not follow from the evidence. The court does not explain, nor could it, how Mr. Reinke could 
have "carelessly" noted both that Casey's eyes were present and that they were brown. To the 
contrary, the court's reasoning was that since Mr. Reinke failed to note certain features which 
were certainly present, i.e., the autopsy wounds, that he must have been inaccurate in noting the 
eyes were both present and brown. CR 2369-70. Plainly, the conclusion does not logically follow 
from the premise. For example, if a person fills out a car accident report and notes both of the 
cars were red, but does not note the license numbers of the car, it cannot be concluded that the 
witness did not accurately report: 1) that there were cars or 2) that the cars were red. Mr. Reinke 
did not inaccurately report that there were no autopsy wounds, he failed to repOli them. 
The failure to report details, i. e., the autopsy wounds, does not make the details which 
were reported, i.e., the presence of brown eyes, the presence of bruises, inaccurate or false. (It is 
more logical to conclude that Mr. Reinke would have left the space on the form blank had he not 
observed them and noted their color.) Thus, even if Mr. Reinke "filled out the report hastily" and 
failed to note something present, it is illogical to conclude that he did not accurately report what 
he did note on the report. Plus, it is contrary to all human experience to conclude that a competent 
adult would not be ablc to tell a pair of eyes from two empty eye sockets, especially if that adult is 
also a trained mortician, like Mr. Reinke. 
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The court notes that it seems improbable that the eyes were removed on 12/31, given the 
short time the body was at St. Luke's and the fact that the face samples had been taken prior to the 
long bone survey. CR 2368-2369. Mr. Stevens agrees that the 30th is the most logical and thus 
most likely date, but only notes that the eyes had to have been removed prior to the preparations 
for the burial on the afternoon of December 31, leaving only the afternoon of the 29th (after the 
embalming) - and the afternoon of the 31 st (when he returned from St. Luke's after the X-rays) as 
possibilities. Of course, since Mr. Kerr did not observe the moist face wounds until noon on the 
31 st, it is possible that the eyes were removed the morning of December 31, prior to Mr. Kerr's 
observations and his transport of Casey's body to St. Luke's Hospital. 
As set forth above, the evidence presented by Mr. Stevens proved that Casey's eyes were 
still there when he was embalmed and the trial court erred by concluding that Mr. Stevens did not 
carry his burden of proof. 
(b) Members of the prosecution team were aware of the post-
embalming removal 
Circumstantial evidence shows that the trial prosecutors knew of the post-embalming 
removal, but even if they didn't know, other members of the prosecution team knew. First, 
prosecutor Jan Bennetts, at the preliminary hearing, suggested in a question that the eyes were 
removed post-autopsy. 
Q. And Doctor [Slaughter], after you completed the autopsy, did you - were there 
documented retinal hemorrhages in Casey? 
A. Yes. J retrieved the eyes and sent them to the University of California at San 
Francisco[.] 
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Petitioner's Exhibit A, p. 96, In. 9-14 (emphasis added). This exchange shows that both the 
doctor and prosecutor were aware that the eyes were taken post-autopsy, but the prosecutor caught 
herself before she plainly revealed that fact to the defense. 
We know that Ms. Bennetts was concerned about the eyes because of the note found in the 
coroner's case file where she left a message for Mr. Sonnenberg stating that she "needs to know 
about chain of custody of eyes." State's Exhibit 149. This phone call must have been made prior 
to the start of the second trial because Ms. Bennetts left the pre-2002 prosecutor's telephone 
number (#364-2150)6 and there was no reason for Ms. Bennetts to have contacted the coroner 
about the eyes after the 1999 trial and before Mr. Elam's telephone call to her in 2003, which 
prompted Det. Jim Miller's investigation. 
In addition, after the preliminary hearing, Ms. Bennetts carefully avoided questioning Dr. 
Slaughter about when he removed the eyes. At the first trial, she did not ask him at all about the 
eyes during direct examination. Petitioner's Exhibit B, p. 1096 - 1111. Nor did she ask Dr. 
Slaughter ifhe removed the eyes at autopsy at the second trial. Instead, she deftly avoided the 
issue by artful questioning: 
Q. Doctor, with regard to Casey's eyes, did you perform a procedure to remove 
Casey's eyes? 
A. Yeah, ... I just took the eyes out and put in a fixative to make sure that they 
stayed the way they are now and sent it to a pathologist specially trained in that 
area. 
6 In 2002, the prosecutor's office moved into the new Ada County Courthouse on West 
Front Street in Boise. The office's number changed to 287-7700 at that time. (TrPCP p. 640, In. 
9-22.) Both trials in this case occurred at the former Ada County Courthouse on West Jefferson 
Street in Boise. 
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Plaintiff s Exhibit C, p. 411, 111. 12-20.7 
Dr. Slaughter was never asked directly whether he took the eyes at autopsy until 2004 
when he responded, "Honestly, I don't remember the exact instant I took the eyes. I do vaguely 
remember, this is ten years ago, removing the eyes." Plaintiffs Exhibit X, p. 40, In. 3-6. Even 
then, the question was put to him by Elaine Sharp, counsel for Mr. Stevens, not the prosecutor. 
Id. 
In sum, the circumstantial evidence establishes that at least one of the trial prosecutors 
knew the eyes had not been removed at the autopsy. But, even if the prosecutors were unaware of 
the post-embalming removal of the eyes prior to trial, they still had a constitutional duty to 
disclose the evidence. The duty of disclosure under Brady extends to all persons working as part 
of the prosecution team or intimately connected with the government's case. The Supreme Court 
has written that "the rule encompasses evidence 'known only to police investigators and not to the 
prosecutor.' In order to comply with Brady, therefore, 'the individual prosecutor has a duty to 
learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in this case, 
including the police.'" Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. at 280, quoting Kyles, 514 U.S., at 437 
(internal citation omitted). "Because prosecutors rely so heavily on the police and other law 
enforcement authorities, the obligations imposed under Brady would be largely ineffective if those 
other members of the prosecution team had no responsibility to inform the prosecutor about 
7 Dr. Slaughter'S testimony that he sent the eyes to Dr. Crawford says nothing about 
where or when the eyes were removed. The cover letter from the Boise Pathology Group to Dr. 
Crawford is dated April 4, 1997, well after December 29, 1996, the date of the autopsy and 
December 30,1996, when the eyes were most likely removed post-autopsy at Dakan's Funeral 
Chapel. Exhibit 213 (attachment b). 
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evidence that undermined the state's preferred theory of the crime." J\1oldowan v. City of Warren, 
578 F.3d 351,377 (6th Cir. 2009). 
This duty to disclose has been found to include evidence solely in the possession of a 
medical examiner. Rose v. State, 787 So. 2d 786, 796 (Fla. 2001) (evidence withheld under Brady 
when a medical examiner failed to provide photographs taken during an autopsy to both the 
prosecutor and defendant). And, in this case, both Mr. Sonnenberg and his website state that 
whenever the cause of a person's death cannot be certified by a physician, the Coroner "shall go to 
the place of death and take charge of the body. An investigation into the events leading up to the 
person's death shall commence in cooperation with the appropriate law enforcement agency." 
Exhibit AA to Deposition of Erwin Sonnenberg, p. 2 (State's Exhibit 204) (emphasis added). 
Among the agencies the Coroner's Office "regularly cooperate[s] with and provide[s] assistance" 
to includes both the Meridian Police Department and the Ada County Prosecutor's Office. Jd. 
During the hearing, Mr. Sonnenberg testified that he had a hand in writing the text on the 
website and approved of the content. (TrPCP, p. 407, In. 15-21.) He also said that his office's 
legal responsibilities were the same in 1996 as today. (TrPCP p. 408, In. 4-7.) But, of course, this 
obligation to assist law enforcement is not just Mr. Sonnenberg's opinion of how his office should 
work. Mutual cooperation between coroners and law enforcement in suspicious death 
investigations is required by statute. I.e. §§ 19-4301(2), 4301A(1). 
Here it is clear that many members of the prosecution team knew that Casey's eyes had 
been removed post-embalming. Dr. Slaughter, an agent of the coroner's office, knew the eyes had 
been removed post-embalming because he removed them. Mr. Sonnenberg knew because he was 
the one who directed Dr. Slaughter to remove the eyes and hold them until further instructed. 
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Further, Mr. Sonnenberg may have been present at the funeral home when the eyes were most 
likely removed. Dave Sherner, who was present and took photos, knew the eyes had not been 
removed at the autopsy. Detective Jim Miller who was also at the autopsy and also took photos 
knew. Sgt. Gene Trakel who was at the autopsy must also have known. And Detective Joe Miller 
somehow knew. See Petitioner's Exhibit U: Miller Report (9/4/2003) p. 1 ("I spoke to Detective 
Joe Miller ... [h]e remembers Casey's eyes being collected after the autopsy. He thought there 
had been at least one trip made to Dakan's Funeral Chapel by the coroner's office to collect 
Casey's eyes and the tissue samples."). Finally, while not necessary to prove a Brady claim, the 
circumstantial evidence also shows that at least one of the handling prosecuting attorneys had 
knowledge. 
(c) Members of the defense were not alerted to the post-embalming 
removal of the eyes 
It is undisputed that the state did not disclose any evidence that the eyes had been removed 
post-autopsy until 2003, more than four years after the end of the second trial, when it provided 
Detective Jim Miller's report to the defense. Further, no one on the defense team knew that the 
eyes had been removed post-autopsy until then. (TrPCP p. 364, In. 12-18 (Edward Odessey - lead 
counsel); p. 799, In. 16-20 (John DeFranco - co-counsel); p. 774, In. 4 (Glenn Elam-
investigator)). 
(d) The withheld evidence was both exculpatory and impeaching 
Had Mr. Stevens known that the eyes were removed after embalming, he could have 
presented evidence that the macular folds were caused by the embalming and post-mortem 
removal. This evidence was exculpatory because it tended to disprove the state's theory that Mr. 
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Stevens shook Casey and further supported Mr. Stevens' theory that Casey fell down the stairs. 
As explained by Dr. Wecht: 
[O]ne cannot rule out in this case the distinct possibility that the damage to the 
macula - the peri-macular folds - was caused by post-embalming removal, i.e., that 
damage is, in fact, nothing more than post-mortem and post-embalming artifact. In 
this regard, I note that the child's treating ophthalmologist, Dr. Kent, testified he 
could not visualize damage to the macula when he examined the child at the 
hospital during life. 
Petitioner's Exhibit J, p. 3-4. (Tr Vol. II, p. 754, In. 18-21 ("Q And in those photos can you see 
any macular or retinal folding? A I don't think I could see that on the photographs.")). Dr. Kane 
also noted that he had reviewed the photographs of the fundi and did not see any peri-macular 
folds. Petitioner's Exhibit 0, p. 2. Dr. Kane wrote: "I am unaware of an instance or published 
report where perimacular folds were present but were not visualized during life, except when the 
eyes were completely filled with blood thus obscuring any direct visualization," but "that was not 
the situation in the case of Casey Whiteside." Id; see also Petitioner's Exhibit P (Affidavit of 
Patrick E. Lantz, M.D.). 
Dr. Wecht continued: 
I have reviewed the slides of the eyes of Casey Whiteside. There is no vital 
reaction, i.e., tissue response to injury or hemorrhage, within the retina and 
maculae folds. To a reasonable degree of medical and scientific certainty, it is my 
opinion that the post-embalming removal of the eyes caused the damage to and 
around the macula and the retina folds; or, at the very least, that such a mechanism 
of injury could not possibly be ruled out under these circumstances. 
Exhibit K, p. 4. 
(e) Prejudice resultedfj·om the withholding of the evidence 
The evidence withheld from the defense severely undermined the state's evidence of 
retinal hemorrhaging which was vital to it proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, 
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constitutional error occurred. Under Brady, relief should be granted when "there is a reasonable 
probability that, had the [withheld] evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the 
proceedings would have been different." Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. at 437. Unlike a new trial 
motion, the defendant does not need to show the evidence would have resulted in an acquittal. A 
"reasonable probability" of a different result is shown when the government's suppression of 
evidence "undennines confidence in the outcome of the trial." Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434, quoting 
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678; see also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,104 (1976) ("The defendant 
must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the 
result ofthe proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.") Thus, the inquiry is whether there is a 
reasonable probability that a jury, after considering the new evidence, would have a reasonable 
doubt as to the defendant's guilt. 
The new medical evidence is sufficient to undennine confidence in the verdict, even if it 
does not completely dispel the state's evidence at trial. 
First, the withheld evidence contradicts the state's trial theory that Casey was shaken 
before the fatal blunt force trauma occurred. The state emphasized the existence of the macular 
folds as proof of shaken baby syndrome during closing argument. 
And the macular folds, if we remember, that he put down right here. This is the 
macula, and Casey had folds and that he has only - he has never seen, but in the 
literature there are reported two cases of macular fold other than shaking and that 
was in an auto accident and that was in a shooting. 
Petitioner's Exhibit D (Closing Argument Transcript), p. 367, In. 14-20. This argument was 
repeated by the state in its rebuttal argument. Jd., p. 445, In 5-8. This argument was also 
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supported by the testimony of Dr. Crawford who explained that at one time macular folds were 
actually considered to be "pathognomonic, " i. e., that "nothing else could produce them except for 
shaken baby syndrome." ld., p. 775, In. 22-24. The doctor, however, noted that was not quite true 
because there were two known cases where macular folds were present in non-shaken baby cases. 
(In his post-trial affidavit, he increased that number to three. See Plaintiff's Exhibit N, p. 3.) So 
while not pathognomonic, the presence of macular folds was "very significant," and "very highly 
specific." Exhibit D, p. 775, In. 20; p. 776, In. 17. Further, in those two cases the macular folds 
were not found in both eyes. Exhibit D, p. 776, In. 1O-1l. 
So, according to Dr. Crawford, there is no known case of bilateral macular folds which 
was not a shaken baby case. But, if the jury had been made aware that the macular folds were 
caused by the embalming process it would explain why they had not been seen by Dr. Kent prior 
to embalming and there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have concluded that Casey 
was not a shaken baby because of the absence of macular folds. This would have led to an 
acquittal because the jury would have rejected the state's argument that Mr. Stevens inflicted the 
blunt force trauma while he was violently shaking Casey. See Exhibit D, p. 381, In. 15-19. 
Other than Dr. Kent's testimony, Mr. Stevens did not have an adequate response to that 
evidence because he did not know at that time that the perimacular folds were simply artifacts of 
the embalming process. Dr. Thibault simply opined that shaking could not cause macular folds. 
Exhibit C, p. 1586, In. 2-14. Dr. Plunkett stated that "[n]o one knows" what the significance of 
the presence of macular folds might be, how they occur, or the range of circumstances under 
which they occur. Exhibit C, p. 1978 In. 13 - p. 1979, In. 11. 
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The withheld eye evidence undennines the state's theory that Mr. Stevens was angry at 
Casey, shook him violently and then in a rage hit Casey's head against the bathtub. The jury 
likely found that the evidence that Casey was a shaken baby showed that Mr. Stevens was the kind 
of person who would intentionally injure a child, thus making the state's theory believable. 
In addition to rebutting the state's theory, the withheld evidence also supported Mr. 
Stevens's statements that he was sleeping when Casey fell down the stairs. The jury likely 
rejected Mr. Stevens's defense because the state's eye evidence showed that Mr. Stevens was not 
asleep but violently shaking Casey just prior to the blunt force injury. Absent the shaken baby 
evidence, there was no evidence presented that Mr. Stevens ever physically abused Casey or even 
touched Casey that morning prior to the fall. (For example, there were no bruises on Casey 
indicating that Mr. Stevens had grabbed him and shaken him.) If the jury had heard that the eye 
injuries were likely caused by the post-embalming removal, it would not have decided the cause 
of death was intentional blunt force trauma. It would have believed the head injury was caused by 
a fall down the stairs. 
Moreover, there was other evidence presented to refute the state's shaken baby theory and 
that evidence combined with the missing evidence about the macular folds being artifactual would 
have caused an acquittal. In his examination of Casey's neck, Dr. Slaughter "did not find any 
evidence of injury." (Tr. Vol. II, p. 435, In. 2.) Similarly, Dr. Ronald Jutzy, a neurosurgeon, 
examined Casey's cervical spine and found it to be "normal and intact." (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1264, In. 
5-7.) Dr. Lawrence Thibault, a medical doctor and professor of bioengineering and neurosurgery, 
testified that there would be injuries to the neck if an infant had been violently shaken. But the 
autopsy report showed no damage to Casey's spine. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1598, In. 23 - p. 1600, In. 15.) 
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In addition, Dr. Slaughter did not recognize any signs of Diffuse Axonial Injury. (Tr. Vol. 
II, p. 417, In. 23-24.) Likewise, Dr. Wilbur Smith, a pediatric radiologist, did not see any signs of 
DAI when reviewing Casey's CAT scans. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1416, In. 6-9.) Dr. Brady testified that 
DAI is an indication that tearing or shearing injuries to the brain have occurred which is a "marker 
of shaken baby syndrome." (Tr. Vol. II, p. 483, In. 15 p. 484, In. 5.) 
David Sherner, who examined Casey pre-autopsy, did not see any fingermarks showing a 
"grabbing pattern" on Casey. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 223, In. 16-25; p. 224, In. 10-18; p. 225, In. 8-20.) 
Mr. Sherner's reports made at the time of his examination of Casey indicated that all the bruises 
on Casey's body were yellow or brown. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 228, In. 6-10; p. 230, In. 5-9.) Dr. Kim 
also testified that she observed brown and yellow bruising on Casey when she examined him at 
the pediatric intensive care unit. She stated that, "[t]ypically when the bruises have turned yellow 
or brown, they're at least a week old." (Tr. Vol. II, p. 116, In. 7-9.) Moreover, Dr. Kim did not 
note the "presence of a fresh bruise or a bruise that Casey received that day." (Tr. Vol. II, p. 140, 
In. 13-16.) However, one would expect fresh fingermark bruises on Casey's amlS or torso had 
Mr. Stevens grabbed Casey and violently shaken him. 
In summary, there was non-eye evidence which refuted the state's shaken baby theory. 
The fact that the perimacular folds were the only shaken baby "marker" which were not 
adequately explained at trial made that evidence particularly damaging to the defense. It strongly 
supported the state's theory that Mr. Stevens was angry at Casey and shook him before inflicting 
the blunt force trauma. That is why the withheld/undiscovered evidence that the macular folds 
were caused by embalming is both exculpatory and impeaching of the state's case. It refutes the 
state's theory that Mr. Stevens violently shook Casey before hitting Casey's head on the bathtub. 
58 
It also corroborates Mr. Stevens' testimony that Casey fell down the stairs and received his 
injuries in that way. It, therefore, creates a reasonable probability of a different result at trial. 
3. Conclusion 
The trial court's finding that Mr. Stevens has not proved by a preponderance that the eyes 
were removed post-embalming is not supported by the record. In fact, the only credible evidence 
is that the Casey's eyes were in situ when he was embalmed. That being the case, someone on the 
prosecution team, Dr. Slaughter, the coroner, or a prosecuting attorney was aware of that fact, but 
withheld it from Mr. Stevens. That was a Brady violation. The withheld evidence was both 
exculpatory and impeaching and the withholding prejudiced Mr. Stevens because the evidence 
which could have been presented at trial undermines confidence in the jury's verdict. 
Accordingly, the Court should reverse the denial of the Brady claim and order a new trial. 
C. Petitioner Was Denied the Effective Assistance of Counsel at Trial in Violation of the 
Sixth Amendment Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel Under Strickland v. 
Washington Due to Counsels' Failure to Discover and Present Evidence of the Post-
Embalming Removal of the Eyes 
1. Introduction 
A defendant in a criminal case is guaranteed the effective assistance of counsel under the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Sixth Amendment has 
been incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the 
states. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932). Idaho law also guarantees a criminal 
defendant's right to counsel. Idaho Const. Art. I, § 13; I.C. § 19-852. In general, a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, whether based upon the state or federal constitution, is analyzed 
under the familiar Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) standard. In order to prevail 
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under Strickland, a petitioner must prove: 1) that counsel's performance was deficient in that it 
fell below standards of reasonable professional performance; and 2) that this deficient 
performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 689. The prejudice 
prong of the test is shown if there is a reasonable probability that a different result would have 
been obtained in the case ifthe attorney had acted properly. Id. 
Defense counsel is expected to conduct a thorough pretrial investigation of the case. State 
v. Perez, 99 Idaho 181, 579 P .2d 127 (1978). "The course of that investigation will naturally be 
shaped by a variety of factors, many peculiar to the particular case. Determining whether an 
attorney's pretrial preparation falls below a level of reasonable performance constitutes a question 
oflaw, but is essentially premised upon the circumstances surrounding the attorney's 
investigation." Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 406,775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989) (internal 
citation omitted). See also Richman v. State, 138 Idaho 190,59 P.3d 995 (Ct. App. 2002) 
(Failure to investigate and present evidence concerning defendant's mental condition at 
sentencing constituted deficient performance). 
2. Facts Pertaining to Claim 
Mr. Stevens alleged that his trial counsel were ineffective for failing to discover the 
Mortuary Embalming Report. CR 6-12. This cause of action is based in part upon the district 
court's order denying the new trial motion. In particular, Mr. Stevens alleged that: 
29. The district court denied Stevens's [new trial] motion. 
30. It determined that this evidence was not newly-discovered. 
31. It found that Stevens was aware of the issue earlier and there was "no showing that the 
embalming report could not have been obtained prior to trial with the exercise of due 
diligence. " 
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32. Additionally, the court concluded that the expert witness affidavits submitted with 
Stevens's motion all contained opinions based on a review of evidence which was 
available prior to trial, that this testimony could have been discovered prior to trial, and 
that this testimony was simply a different interpretation of existing evidence. 
33. The Idaho Supreme COUl1 found that substantial and competent evidence in the record 
supports a conclusion that the primary evidence that Casey's eyes were removed after 
embalming - the Mortuary Embalming Report - was available before trial. 
37. Trial counsels' performance was deficient because they did not inquire about the 
Mortuary Embalming Report until well after the trial. 
38. Had they recognized the importance of the Mortuary Embalming Report, trial counsel 
would have discovered the evidence that Casey's eyes were removed post-embalming. 
39. Had they so discovered, they could have presented all the expert testimony Stevens 
presented in support of his motion for a new trial at the jury trial. 
CR 6-12. As noted above, this Court affirmed the district court's decision. State v. Stevens, 
supra. 
The district court denied this claim, writing that: 
There is no dispute counsel did not know about the embalming report prior to trial 
and did not seek to discover it. Therefore counsel's failure to present this evidence 
at trial could not have been a tactical choice. The only question remaining is 
whether counsel's failure to discover this report constitutes deficient performance. 
Stevens argues that because Judge Eismann already found counsel could have 
obtained the embalming report through the exercise of due diligence, counsel's 
performance must necessarily have been deficient. Stevens argues that 
implicit in a finding of lack of due diligence, is a finding there was a duty to 
investigate. In support of this position Stevens cites to Justice Trout's dissenting 
opinion in State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 191 P.3d 217. Justice Trout stated that 
"ordinary or reasonable diligence certainly contains some notion that defense 
counsel must have some reason to go looking for the evidence in the exercise of 
diligence." State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho at 154, 191 P.3d at 232. Because Stevens 
believes a finding of lack of due diligence requires a finding of a duty to 
investigate, he argues that his counsel's performance was deficient when they 
failed to investigate something they had a duty to investigate. 
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This Court disagrees with Stevens. If a duty to investigate is a necessary element for a 
finding oflack of due diligence then it seems unlikely Judge Eismann and the 
Supreme Court would have found that defense counsel failed to exercise due 
diligence, because there was no reason for counsel to seek out this embalming 
report. The fact the Supreme Court upheld Judge Eismann's decision and rejected 
Justice Trout's reasoning suggests to this Court that a duty to investigate is not a 
prerequisite for a finding of lack of due diligence. Because Judge Eismann 
did not find counsel had a duty to investigate, only that they could have obtained 
the report through the exercise of due diligence, this Court remains free to 
determine whether a reasonable attorney would have sought out the embalming 
report. 
In this case, there was no indication prior to Stevens' second trial that Casey's eyes may 
have been removed post-embalming. Dr. Slaughter testified he retrieved Casey's eyes and 
there was nothing to suggest he did not do so at autopsy. Stevens' counsel most likely 
relied on the truth of Dr. Slaughter's statements. An embalming report is not something a 
defense attorney would normally seek to discover. As it turned out, the embalming report 
in this case contained relevant information, but this was not known to counsel prior to the 
second trial. This Court must "reconstruct the circumstances at the time of trial from 
defense counsel's perspective." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. At the time of trial, counsel 
had no reason to investigate Casey's embalming report. Without any reason to believe the 
embalming report might contain relevant evidence, counsel cannot be held to have 
rendered deficient performance for failing to discover it. 
The Court finds counsel's failure to discover the embalming report was reasonable 
under prevailing professional norms because a reasonable attorney would not have 
sought to discover this report. 
CR 2370-71. 
3. Why Relief Should be Granted 
This Court and the district court (during the new trial proceedings) have already held 
counsels' performance was deficient in the criminal case and the district court should have 
followed its own and this Court's ruling. Further, the evidence showed that counsel's failure to 
locate the embalming report was deficient. Finally, counsel's deficient performance prejudiced 
Mr. Stevens. 
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(a) The District Court and this Court have already found that Mr. 
Stevens's attorneys' peljormances were deficient infailing to 
discover and present evidence regarding the condition of the eyes 
Justice Eismann and this Court have already ruled in Mr. Stevens's favor as to this issue. 
Thus, the district court could not find that trial counsels' investigation regarding the mortuary 
report was constitutionally adequate. 
In particular, Justice Eismann wrote that "[t]he embalming report certainly indicates that 
Casey's eyes were not removed until after he was embalmed. Thus there is sufficient evidence to 
conclude that Casey's eyes were not removed until after he was embalmed." Petitioner's Exhibit 
E-4, p. 690 (Order Denying Motion for New Trial, p. 10.) Nevertheless, the Justice denied 
Stevens's new trial motion finding that this evidence was not newly-discovered. It wrote: "The 
Mortuary Embalming Report shows that the person performing the embalming noted that Casey's 
eyes were brown .... There is no showing that the embalming report could not have been 
obtained prior to trial with the exercise of due diligence." Exhibit E-4, p. 692; Order Denying 
Motion for New Trial, p. 12. 
On appeal, this Court found that substantial and competent evidence in the record 
supported the conclusion that the primary evidence that Casey's eyes were removed after 
embalming - the Mortuary Embalming Report - was available before trial. It wrote: "Once again, 
the district court did not abuse its discretion. Substantial and competent evidence in the record 
supports a conclusion that the primary evidence that Casey's eyes were removed after 
embalming-the Mortuary Embalming Report-was available before trial." State v. Stevens, 146 
Idaho at 146,191 P.3d at 224. Finally, the Supreme C0U11 concluded: "In order to be newly 
discovered evidence, the evidence itself, not just importance or materiality of that evidence, must 
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be unknown and unavailable prior to trial. The fact that the defense did not inquire about the 
report until well after the trial does not make this report newly discovered evidence." Id. (citation 
omitted). 
The district court found that it could ignore the above and drew a distinction between 
defense counsel acting with due diligence with respect to their investigation and defense counsel 
adequately investigating the case. That attempted distinction is fallacious, however, because the 
finding that trial counsel could have found the document through the exercise of "due diligence" 
requires subsidiary findings of both a duty to search for the evidence and the ability to fulfill the 
duty. There is no doubt that trial counsel can be diligent even when he does not find a document 
ifthere was no reason to go looking for the document. The problem with the court's conclusion is 
that Justice Eismann and this Court have already found there was a duty to look. 
We know this Court has already rejected the court's conclusion because it is the same 
position taken by Justice Trout in her dissent in Mr. Stevens's direct appeal. Justice Trout 
believed that a new trial should have been granted because trial counsels' failure to find the 
embalming report was not due to a lack of due diligence as they did not have any reason to look 
for the report. She wrote that "[0 ]rdinary or reasonable diligence certainly contains some notion 
that defense counsel must have some reason to go looking for the evidence in the exercise of 
diligence" and that "there was absolutely no reason for defense counsel to search out an 
embalming report[.]" State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 154, 191 P.3d 217, 232 (2008) (Trout, 1., 
dissenting). The majority, however, disagreed with Justice Trout. Mr. Stevens's argument which 
failed on the direct appeal cannot prevail now simply because it is the state which makes the 
argument. The fact that defense counsel did not act with due diligence was necessary to the 
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court's ruling that the mortuary embalming report was not newly discovered evidence and that 
finding is law of the case. ,Swanson v. Swanson, 134 Idaho at 515, 5 P.3d at 976. 
Further the state should have been judicially estopped from taking a position directly 
opposite the position it argued in the direct appeal. 
Judicial estoppel precludes a party from gaining an advantage by taking one 
position, and then seeking a second advantage by taking an incompatible position. 
Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 252, 92 P.3d 492,502 (2004). The Idaho Supreme 
Court adopted the doctrine of judicial estoppel in Loomis v. Church, 76 Idaho 87, 
277 P.2d 561 (1954). 
A & J Const. Co., Inc. v. Wood, 141 Idaho 682, 684, 116 P.3d 12, 14 (2005).8 As explained by the 
Court of Appeals, there are very important reasons behind the doctrine of judicial estoppel: 
One purpose of the doctrine is to protect the integrity of the judicial system, by 
protecting the orderly administration of justice and having regard for the dignity of 
judicial proceedings. The doctrine is also intended to prevent parties from playing 
fast and loose with the courts. 
Robertson Supply, Inc. v. Nicholls, 131 Idaho 99,101,952 P.2d 914,916 eCt. App. 1998) 
(internal citations omitted) cited with favor in A & J Const. Co., Inc. v. Wood, 141 Idaho at 685, 
116 P.3d at 15. 
8 Mr. Stevens argued during the new trial litigation that the embalming report was newly 
discovered evidence as it was not reasonably available before trial. He still believes that he 
should have been granted a new trial on that basis. This Court, however, disagreed with him and 
there is evidence in the record to support the Court's conclusion. First, Ms. Bennetts, at the 
preliminary hearing, suggested in a question that the eyes were removed post-autopsy. ("Q. And 
Doctor, after you completed the autopsy . ... " The doctor testified that he had "retrieved," not 
removed the eyes and his autopsy report does not mention the eyes being removed at that time. 
Exhibit A, p. 96, In. 9-14 (emphasis added); Exhibit V. And he is not asked by the prosecutor at 
the first trial if he removed the eyes. Also, none of the autopsy photos show Casey with his eyes 
removed. These facts are support for the conclusion that defense counsel should have 
investigated the chain of custody for the eyes, especially given the importance of the condition of 
the eyes to the shaken baby theory, and would have found the report had they done so. While 
Mr. Stevens still agrees with Justice Trout's dissenting opinion in the direct appeal, he has to live 
with this Court's previous ruling; but so does the prosecutor, who should not have taken a 
different position from the one taken in the new trial motion, and the district court, which was 
not free to disagree with its own and this Court's previous rulings. 
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Here, the state's deficient performance argument should not have been adopted by the 
district court. It was barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel because the state argued during the 
motion for new trial and the direct appeal that trial counsel did not act with due diligence. It may 
not now argue that counsel acted with due diligence as there was no reason to investigate whether 
the eyes had been removed post-autopsy. 
(b) This deficient performance prejudiced Mr. Stevens 
Trial counsel's failure to adequately investigate prejudiced Mr. Stevens as set forth in the 
Brady claim section, at pages 34-59 above. In fact, Justice Trout, during the direct appeal, found 
that the evidence was likely to produce an acquittal. She wrote: "The State's theory of the case 
was that Casey had been violently shaken by Stevens and that the retinal hemorrhaging in Casey's 
eyes was strong evidence of that. Indeed, Dr. Brooks Crawford, the ophthalmologist to whom 
Casey's eyes were sent for examination, testified at trial that' I can think of no other way to 
explain the findings, this constellation of findings that we have here, except for violent shaking. 
There's no other way to explain it.' Thus, evidence that embalming the eyes may have caused the 
hemorrhaging is critical evidence and could very well have caused the jury to question the State's 
theory and produced an acquittal." 146 Idaho at 154-155,191 P.3d 232-233 (Trout, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis in internal quotation added). (It is important to note that no other Justice reached the 
issue of the likely effect of the evidence. The other four Justices all agreed that trial counsel could 
have found the evidence using due diligence. Had those Justices concluded, as Justice Trout did, 
that trial counsel could not have found the evidence, it is likely they would have agreed with 
Justice Trout's evaluation of the effect of the evidence on the verdict.) 
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Unlike in the Brady claim, Mr. Stevens was not required to prove that the eyes were 
actually removed post-autopsy in order to prevail under Strickland. All he needed to show was 
that trial counsel could have presented substantial evidence at trial that the eyes were not removed 
at the autopsy, which there is no doubt he could have. Even the district court conceded that 
"Stevens has certainly raised doubts whether Casey's eyes and tissue samples were removed at 
autopsy." CR 2368. And it noted that "the embalming report ... strongly suggests that Casey's 
eyes were present at the time of embalming." CR 2369. And it concluded that "[b]oth parties 
have made a compelling case for their version of the events[.] CR 2367. So, even if the jury was 
not convinced by a preponderance of the evidence that the eyes were actually removed post-
autopsy, it still could have had a doubt whether the macular folds were caused by shaking as 
suggested by the state or were simply an artifact of the post-embalming removal. 
Moreover, it is important to note that Mr. Stevens is not required to prove that the eye 
evidence probably would have resulted in an acquittal, as he was during the new trial motion 
litigation. The standard in this proceeding is lower. Like the standard for a Brady claim, under 
Strickland a "reasonable probability" of a different result is less than the "likely to result in an 
acquittal" standard needed for a new trial under State v. Drapeau, supra. 
Even when the specified attorney error results in the omission of certain evidence, 
the newly discovered evidence standard is not an apt source from which to draw a 
prejudice standard for ineffectiveness claims. The high standard for newly 
discovered evidence claims presupposes that all the essential elements of a 
presumptively accurate and fair proceeding were present in the proceeding whose 
result is challenged. An ineffective assistance claim asserts the absence of one of 
the crucial assurances that the result of the proceeding is reliable, so finality 
concerns are somewhat weaker and the appropriate standard of prejudice should be 
somewhat lower. The result of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable, and hence 
the proceeding itself unfair, even if the errors of counsel cannot be shown by a 
preponderance of the evidence to have determined the outcome. 
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Accordingly, the appropriate test for prejudice finds its roots in the test for 
materiality of exculpatory information not disclosed to the defense by the 
prosecution and in the test for materiality of testimony made unavailable to the 
defense by Government deportation of a witness. The defendant must show that 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (emphasis added, citations omitted). 
Here, as explained in the Brady claim section above, there is a reasonable probability of a 
different result due to the eye evidence alone. Consequently, the district court erred in denying 
relief. 
4. Conclusion 
Adequate investigation is one component of adequate representation under the Sixth 
Amendment. "In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a 
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
691. Here trial counsel did not make a strategic decision rendering further investigation into the 
condition of the eyes unnecessary. Nor did they do an adequate investigation into the condition as 
the embalming report was available to them prior to the trial but was not found. Had they 
obtained the Mortuary Embalming Report, trial counsel would have discovered the evidence that 
Casey's eyes were removed post-embalming. And, had they so discovered, they could have 
presented all the expert testimony Mr. Stevens presented at the new trial proceedings and in post-
conviction. The Court should reverse the district court's denial of this claim, vacate the conviction 
and grant a new trial. 
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D. Petitioner Was Denied the Effective Assistance of COllnsel at Trial in Violation of the 
Sixth Amendment Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel Under Strickland v. 
Washington due to Counsels' Failure to Discover and Present Evidence Regarding the 
Effects of Propulsid and Zithromax: 
1. Facts Pertaining to Argument 
At the time of his death, Casey Whiteside was taking Propulsid to treat his acid reflux 
disorder. (Tr Vol. II, p. 690, In. 16 - p. 691, In. 11.) At the time of the second trial, it was known 
that Propulsid should not be prescribed to infants and that it could cause serious, life-threatening 
ventricular arrhythmias, but that fact was not brought to the attention of the jury by defense 
counsel. Mr. Stevens alleged this constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 
At the evidentiary hearing, toxicologist Loring Beals testified. (TrPCP p. 264, In. 15 - p. 
319, In. 12.) He testified the following information was available to defense counsel prior to the 
beginning of the second trial of Mr. Stevens. 
First, a letter was sent to physicians by the manufacturer of Propulsid, dated June 26, 1998, 
six months before the start of the second trial. It said, in part: 
Safety and effectiveness in pediatric patients have not been established. Although 
causality has not been established, serious adverse events, including death, have 
been reported in infants and children treated with cisapride. Several pediatric 
deaths were due to cardiovascular events (third degree heart block and ventricular 
tachi cardia). 
Pediatric deaths have been associated with seizures and there has been at least one 
case of "sudden unexplained death" in a 3-month-old infant. Other unlabeled 
potential serious events which have been rep0l1ed in pediatric patients include: 
antinuclear antibody (ANA) positive, anemia, hemolytic anemia, 
methemoglobinemia, hyperglycemia, hypoglycemia with acidosis, unexplained 
apneic episodes, confusion, impaired concentration, depression, apathy, visual 
changes accompanied by amnesia, and severe photosensitivity reaction. 
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A one month old male infant received 3 mg/kg of cisapride four times per day for 5 
days. The patient developed third degree heart block and subsequently died of 
right ventricular perforation caused by pacemaker wire insertion. 
June 26,1998, "Dear Doctor" Letter, p. 2, attached to Plaintiffs Exhibit F (Affidavit of Loring 
Beals, M.S.). The letter also warns in bold type: "Recommended doses of PROPULSID should 
not be exceeded." ld, p. 1. Further, at the time of the second trial, defense counsel knew that 
Casey was taking Propulsid at the time of his death and that the dosage prescribed had more than 
doubled between March 6, 1996 and October 29, 1996. (TrPCP, p. 363, In. 2-10.) Petitioner's 
Exhibit T (Affidavit of William H. Durham, M.D., p. 2). 
In addition, the Dear Doctor letter states that Propulsid is contraindicated with antibiotics 
such as erythromycin. Letter, p. 2. "Concomitant oral or intravenous administration of the 
following drugs [including erythromycin] with cisapride may lead to elevated cisapride blood 
levels and is contraindicated." ld. At the time of the second trial, defense counsel knew Casey 
was taking Zithromax, an antibiotic related to erythromycin. (TrPCP, p. 363, In. 2-10.) In 
children, Zithromax is used to treat middle ear infection, pneumonia, tonsillitis, and strep throat. 
So, in addition to Casey taking Propulsid in excess of the recommended dose, defense counsel 
also knew he was taking Zithromax, which may have led to even higher levels of Propulsid in his 
blood. 
On June 29, 1998, the Food and Drug Administration issued a press release about its 
revised warning labels for Propulsid. It refers to the "Dear Doctor" letter and further notes that 
the "revised labeling for Propulsid emphasizes that the drug should not be used in patients taking 
certain antibiotics[.]" Petitioner's Exhibit F (attachment FDA Talk Letter, June 29,1998, p. 1). 
This includes certain macrolide antibiotics such as erythromycin and Zithromax. 
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On July 25, 1996, two years before the "Dear Doctor" letter, the New England Journal of 
Medicine printed a letter from two employees of the FDA entitled "Cisapride and Fatal 
Arrhythmia." The letter notes that "[ fJrom September 1993, the month in which the marketing of 
cisapride (Propulsid, Janssen Pharmaceutica, Titusville, N.J.) began, to April 1996, the Food and 
Drug Administration's MedWatch reporting program ... received reports of 34 patients in whom 
torsade de pointe developed while using this drug. Four were reported to have died, and 16 
responded to resuscitation after cardiopulmonary arrest." (Plaintiffs Exhibit F-3.) (Torsade de 
pointes is a form of ventricular tachycardia which usually terminates spontaneously but frequently 
recurs and may degenerate into ventricular fibrillation.) The letter noted a connection between the 
onset of arrhythmia and the use of Propulsid in combination with a macrolide antibiotic (such as 
Zithromax). Exhibit F-3, p. 1. The authors warned: "physicians should avoid prescribing 
cisapride to patients who are taking ... erythromycin[.]" ld., p. 2. This letter cited to an earlier 
"Dear Doctor" letter from the manufacturer as well as an article in the medical journal Lancet. 
See Plaintiff s Exhibit F -2. In addition, a review of materials released by the manufacturer 
showed that "from July 1993 through December 1999, 341 cases [of side effects] have been 
spontaneously reported including 80 deaths." Plaintiffs Exhibit F (Affidavit of Loring Beals), p. 
2. 
This boxed warning about Propulsid appeared in the 1998 Edition of the well-known and 
widely-available Physician's Desk Reference: 
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Warning: Serious cardiac arrhythmias including ventricular 
tachicardia, ventricular fibrillation, torsades de points, and 
QT prolongation have been reported in patients taking 
PROPULSID® with other drugs ... such as ... 
erthromycin[.] Some of these events have been fatal. 
PROPULSID® is contraindicated in patients taking any of 
these drugs .... 
Plaintiffs Exhibit F-1 (1998 Physician's Desk Reference, 52nd Ed., p. 1308. This warning is 
repeated two other times within the text of the entry. Id. Further, the article notes that "Safety 
and effectiveness in children has not been established." Id. 
All this evidence was available to defense counsel prior to the 1999 trial and could have 
been found with the exercise of due diligence. A local toxicologist, Loring Beals, testified that 
had he been retained in 1998 by defense counsel, he "would have been able to easily" find the 
infonnation above. TrPCP, p. 292, In. 2-7. Mr. DeFranco testified that he was familiar with the 
PDR and knew what it was in 1998. In fact, he believed that the Public Defender's Office had a 
copy of the PDR in the staff break room at the time of the trial. (TrPCP, p. 584, In. 15-23.) 
However, he did not make effective use of the resource, which was, nearly literally, at his 
fingertips. 
Q. Did you look up Propulsid in the PDR prior to the trial? 
A. I don't have a direct recollection of doing that, but that would seem like a 
reasonable thing to do at the very least. 
Q. Were you aware that in 1998 that the current edition of the PDR warned that 
patients should not take Propulsid with other drugs such as erthromycins? 
A. I am going to say that I was not aware. 
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Q. Were you aware that there had been reports of serious heart arrhythmias in 
patients taking Propulsid? 
A. And I am more eonfident that I was unaware of that. 
Transcript, p. 584, In. 24 - p. 585, In. 8. Mr. DeFranco also testified that he was unaware of the 
Dear Doctor letters and also of the New England Journal of Medicine report. TrPCP p. 881, In. 4 
- p. 812, In. 5. Exhibits F-2 and F-3. Mr. DeFranco further testified: 
Q. Had you been aware of these documents, or these items, would that have 
affected your presentation of evidence at the trial? 
A. I think I would have, at the very least, asked a question about all of those 
things. But I don't know that it would have changed the overall strategy and the 
way I defended the case. 
Q. Ultimately, however, the questions of strategy would be left to Mr. Odessey? 
A. Yes. 
Transcript, p. 587, In. 6-15. 
What Mr. Odessey would have done with the available evidence was quite different from 
Mr. DeFranco's answer: 
Q. Had you been so aware, would that have affected your presentation of evidence 
at trial? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How so? 
A. Cause of death of Casey Whiteside he was only alive 11 months. The last 
nine months of his life he was being administered Propulsid throughout in 
conjunction with Zithromax mostly, or some other penicillin derivative throughout. 
Dosages were increasing for both Propulsid and Zithromax, is my recollection. 
And even though the child was not really improving, he was still being 
administered those medications. 
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In fact, Casey Whiteside, suffered those consequences of Propulsid, which is never 
supposed to be given to an infant; that is to say, under one year of age anyway, but 
if they affected his balance, dizziness and perhaps caused a heart attack, Casey 
Whiteside could well have died at the top of those stairs in Meridian before any 
impact occurred, and that could well have been presented at trial. 
Q. Does the effect of Propulsid affect your theory of the case that Casey fell down 
the stairs? 
A. Well, it's consistent with because of the dizziness and unbalance issues. There 
was testimony at trial about some of the balance issues, the prone to falling, but 
never backed up with the medical component of the Propulsid causing the poor 
balance, dizziness, as well as the heart attack issues. 
Q. Would you characterize this evidence as contradictory or complementary with 
your theory of the case? 
A. Complementary. 
Transcript, p. 145, In. 25 - p. 146, In. 21; p. 148, In. 6-19. 
The district court denied Mr. Stevens's claim that trial counsel should have discovered and 
presented this evidence, but erred in doing so, as explained below. 
2. Why Relief Should be Granted 
(a) Trial counsels' performances were deficient because theyfailed 
to discover and present the available evidence regarding the effects 
of Propulsid 
The trial court found counsel were not deficient writing that they conducted an adequate 
pretrial investigation into the drug Propulsid because they "sent letters to Dr. Dimaio and Dr. 
Plunkett asking them about possible drug interaction between Zithromax and Propulsid." CR 
2374. And "[c]ounsel also talked to attorney Annabelle Hall about the possible dangers of 
Propulsid." ld. The court also stated that it appeared that neither Dr. Dimaio nor Dr. Plunkett 
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ever informed counsel Propulsid should be investigated further. ld. However, it is clear that 
Annabelle Hall alerted eounsel to the possibility that Propulsid played a role in Casey's death. 
(Thus, Mr. Odessey's testimony that it was his belief that "we never got an indication that 
[Propulsid] would be a fruitful area to explore" (TrPCP, p. 365, In. 16-18) was ineorrect.) 
[n partieular, State's Exhibit 109 are notes made by Mr. DeFranco from a telephone 
eonversation with Annabelle Hall on 10/21/1998. The notes indicate Mr. DeFraneo was aware 
that Casey was preseribed both Propulsid and Zithromax and noted: "could drug interactions 
eause liver damage, eould eause heart "aryhmia -(laspe in eonsciousness on stairs), could eause 
D.Le" In addition, State's Exhibit 110 are notes from a conversation between Mr. DeFranco and 
Ms. Hall on 1112111998. Again, Mr. DeFraneo notes that "Zithro / Propulsid" were spoken of and 
notes that "Propulsid almost taken off mkt. What is it being used in a ehild for[?]"9 The exhibit 
also notes that a pediatrieian should be asked "how long was it (Propulsid) taken and "what was 
dosage[?]" (State's Exhibit 126 are undated notes from a eonversation between Mr. DeFraneo 
and Ms. Hall and appear to be rough notes whieh were turned into Exhibit 110 and note 
Zithromax and Propulsid: "not together," "drug interaetion," "Cause Erythmias." Exhibit 126 
also notes the existenee of "1998 - PDR.") Ms. Hall also told Mr. DeFraneo that "the drug 
interaetion is an impoliant area to study in the context of preparing a shaken baby case for 
defense. That it shouldn't be ignored." TrPCP, p. 805, In. 6-9. 
The eourt concluded that "counsel appears to have made the eonscious ehoiee to not 
present evidence eoncerning Propulsid at trial" and found that: 
9 After the second trial, Propulsid was taken off the market by the FDA. Los Angeles 
Times, "PROPULSID: A Heartburn Drug, Now Linked to Children's Deaths," December 20, 
2000. 
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Counsel's decision to omit evidence regarding Propulsid from their trial strategy 
was not based upon inadequate preparation or other shortcomings. Counsel's 
decision was the result of not receiving any positive infonnation from their medical 
experts, which appears to have been the result of a lack of scientific understanding 
about the dangers of Propulsid in 1998. Because counsel made a reasonable 
strategic decision to not pursue the Propulsid theory of death, counsel's 
perfonnance was not deficient. 
CR 2374-75. 
In fact, however, the evidence shows that there was not a conscious decision to not pursue 
the Propulsid theory of death. Rather, the failure to inquire was due to counsel failing to make 
even the most rudimentary investigation. As shown above, had either attorney picked up the 1998 
PDR, which was likely sitting in their law firm's break room (or certainly no further than this 
Court's old law library, only four blocks distance from the old Ada County Public Defender's 
office at 4th and Idaho Street, or the public library only ten blocks away), or even looked at a box 
ofPropulsid, available at their client's home, they would have discovered the boxed warning 
about Propulsid and that would have led them to the rest of the PDR warnings, the Dear Doctor 
letters, the New England Journal of Medicine, the Lancet, and the expert testimony of how 
Propulsid affected this case as set forth below. It was unreasonable of counsel to fail to consult 
with standard reference book on prescription drugs, especially after Annabelle Hall, a lawyer of 
national stature lO had alerted trial counsel to the issue. 
(b) This deficient performance prejudiced Mr. Stevens 
Had trial counsel been aware of the then known effects of Propulsid, they could have 
consulted with a medical expert, such as Loring Beals, regarding the likely effects the drug had on 
10 Mr. DeFranco testified that Ms. Hall is a nationally known criminal defense attorney 
who is a good resource for defense counsel and is generous with her time. (TrPCP p. 887, In. 19 
- p. 888, In. 9.) 
76 
Casey. Had they done so, they would have discovered much of the evidence set forth in Dr. 
Durham's affidavit. Petitioner's Exhibit T. 
In particular, the defense could have presented evidence that Casey's death was likely 
caused by Propulsid. 
Based on the overall clinical situation, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, 
the account of the child falling down the stairs is consistent with a Propulsid-
induced ventricular arrhythmia. Propulsid was not indicated for children. Casey 
was also on another drug, Zithromax, as discussed above. When a person 
experiences a ventricular arrhythmia, the blood pressure cannot be sustained and 
when that happens, the body collapses; given that Casey was known to climb the 
stairs, and given the very high likelihood that he was experiencing torsades de 
pointes, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, the clinical record and autopsy 
findings are consistent with Casey having had a cardiac arrest caused by a 
ventricular arrhythmia. The ultimate cause of death is cardiac arrhythmia. 
Id, p. 4. Dr. Durham also noted that the EMTs "found Casey with an irregular respiratory pattern, 
then pulseless, apneic and asystolic. He had to be given repeated doses of epinephrine and 
atropine before, finally, a heartbeat was reestablished." Id., p. 3. "Asystole" is commonly 
referred to as a "flatline," i. e., the absence of electrical and mechanical activity in the heart. 
"Apnea" means the temporary absence or cessation of breathing. 
Dr. Durham's opinion explains Dr. Bettis's confusion about Casey's death. During a 
telephone conversation with Detective Jim Miller, Dr. Bettis said "I have talked this over with the 
cardiologist and I, as a neurologist I thought to myself what medical condition could exist in a 
previously healthy 11 month old child that could cause a sudden cardiac or a - or respiratory arrest 
at 11 months. I can't think of any." Petitioner's Exhibit W, p. 2-3. (Transcript of telephone 
conversation.) Dr. Bettis also said that the skull fracture was "not the fatal blow," as later claimed 
by the state. Id. Instead, he said, "And why this kid arrested is the big question. And if we don't 
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find any cause on autopsy, that's more suspicious for something else caused is [sic] 
cardiorespiratory arrest." Exhibit W, p. 9-10. The answer to the doctor's big question is that 
Casey arrested because of the Propulsid. And, if the jury found the cause of death was cardiac 
arrhythmia caused by Propulsid in combination with Zithromax, Mr. Stevens would have been 
found not guilty of First-Degree Murder. 
Cardiac arrhythmia as the cause of death is further supported by the Affidavit of Ivan 
Smith, M.D. Petitioner's Exhibit R. He states that the hospital lab work on December 27, 1996 
shows that Casey had a low serum potassium level which "can predispose to ventricular 
arrhythmias." ld., p. 5. Further, he stated that Casey's "medical chart for September 27, 1996, 
contains evidence that is consistent with Casey having suffered a fatal ventricular arrhythmia." 
ld., p. 8. Dr. Smith concludes: 
ld. 
Based on my medical background and my review of the records submitted to me 
for review, it is reasonable to conclude that this infant experienced the following 
sequence of events: 
• Treatment with drug(s) which predispose to arrhythmias 
(arrhythogenic), e.g., Propulsid, in the face of hypokalemia which 
also predisposes to arrhythmias 
• Fatal arrhythmia 
• Cardiac arrest (resulting in cerebral anoxia and cerebral edema) 
• F all and cardiac arrest 
• Death (as a consequence of arrhythmia and cerebral anoxia) 
Dr. Smith's Second Affidavit was admitted as Petitioner's Exhibit S. Dr. Smith stated, 
inter alia, that, in his opinion, "the infant in this case died as the result of the pharmacologic 
effects of the drug interaction between Propulsid and Zithromax which accentuated the propensity 
of Propulsid to cause Torsade de Pointes which is known to result in lethal ventricular 
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arrhythmias with resultant cardiac arrest. Zithromax slows the metabolism of Propulsid, raising 
the blood levels and effects of Propulsid and increasing the risk of Torsades de Pointes." Jd. He 
goes on to say: 
3. Compounding the effects of this drug interaction was the repOli that the infant 
had gastrointestinal symptoms, nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, since diarrhea 
especially can be associated with significant loss of potassium. Low potassium 
also can be associated with lethal cardiac arrhythmias. The initial reported 
potassium level in the emergency room was 3.5 in the presence of profound 
acidosis (pH 6.89). It is reasonable to conclude from this initial low potassium 
level that the infant had been experiencing potassium loss over an unknown period 
of time since the serum potassium level typically initially rises in acute acidosis as 
the body attempts to correct acidosis by moving hydrogen from serum into cells 
and potassium into serum out of cells thus raising serum potassium. 
4. The low serum potassium in the presence of severe acidosis, therefore, suggests 
that there was low potassium level within cells where most of the body's potassium 
resides, which would have made it difficult to reverse cardiac arrest. Serum 
magnesium levels were not reported in documents I received. Low magnesium, 
however, is not uncommonly present concomitantly with low potassium, and it is 
difficult to correct severe ventricular rhythm abnormalities when the magnesium 
level is low. 
5. At some time prior to death, a decongestant containing "pseudo ephedrine" had 
been prescribed. Pseudo ephedrine also could have contributed to cardiac 
irritability. 
6. If information had been presented at trial concerning the cardiac effects of 
Propulsid, its interactions with medications with which the deceased had been 
treated, and their consequences, the trial proceedings could have concluded that the 
infant's death was an unfortunate consequence [fatal arrhythmia] of the 
simultaneous treatment with and interaction between Propulsid and Zithromax, 
which was aggravated by the effects [low potassium] of an intercurrent 
gastrointestinal ailment. These multiple pharmacologic and electrolyte effects 
were additive in leading to the infant's death due to cardiac arrest. 
7. In my opinion, the infant experienced a fatal cardiac arrest, and then sustained 
traumatic injuries as the result of a fall which was the consequence of cardiac 
arrest/loss of consciousness. 
8. I could have testified to the contents of this affidavit in January of 1999. 
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Id. Defense counsel, however, never presented any evidence regarding the effects of Propulsid 
during the trial even though all the information noted above was available prior to the second trial. 
It is anticipated that the state will argue that since Justice Eismann's denial of the new trial 
motion based upon the newly discovered evidence of Propulsid was affirmed by this Court, the 
current ineffective assistance of counsel claim should also be denied. That argument does not 
logically follow. What Justice Eismann wrote regarding the new trial motion was that "[t]he issue 
for the jury was whether Casey's skull fracture was caused by falling on or down the stairs or 
whether it was caused by the Defendant. Offering new evidence to explain why Casey may have 
fallen in the first place would not probably produce an acquittal." Petitioner's Exhibit E-4, p. 693 
(Order Denying New Trial, p. 13).11 However, the finding that the evidence did not meet the new 
trial standard does not foreclose this Court from finding that the failure to present the Propulsid 
evidence was prejudicial under Strickland. All Strickland requires is a reasonable probability of a 
different result, a lower standard than required for a new trial under Drapeau. 
Further, the evidence before this Court goes further than simply explaining why Casey fell 
down the stairs. As explained below, there is a reasonable likelihood of a different result had trial 
counsel presented the available evidence about Propulsid at the second trial. 
First, the issue for the jury was not simply whether the skull fracture was caused by Mr. 
Stevens or by a fall down the stairs. The Propulsid evidence would have allowed the defense to 
raise a reasonable doubt with the jury over whether blunt force trauma was the cause of death, as 
argued by the state. If the jury was unsure whether Casey died as a result of a heart attack caused 
----- ~----~-.----~--
11 Likewise, the district court found that "it was not unreasonable for counsel to not 
investigate other possible causes of Casey's fall." CR 2373. 
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by Propulsid or by blunt force trauma it would be required to return a not guilty verdict to the 
murder charge. This is true even if the jury found the trauma was inflicted by Mr. Stevens. 
Second, the jury in convicting Mr. Stevens could have concluded that the blunt force 
trauma could have been caused by the fall, but found there was not sufficient evidence of a fall. 
That is, the jury might have rejected the defense theory not because it found that a fall was 
unlikely to cause the injuries, but because there was insufficient evidence that a fall occurred. 
Recall that Mr. Stevens did not actually see Casey fall, as he was asleep, and that there were no 
other witnesses to the event. The Propulsid evidence, had it been presented, would have 
explained why Casey lost his balance and fell, making it more likely to have actually occurred in 
the opinion of the jurors. Dr. Durham states that "the account of the child falling down the stairs 
is consistent with a Propulsid-induced ventricular arrhythmia." Petitioner's Exhibit T, p. 4. 
When a person experiences a ventricular arrhythmia, the blood pressure cannot be sustained and 
the body collapses. The jury knew that Casey liked to climb the stairs and it would have known of 
the very high likelihood that he was experiencing torsades de pointes and thus concluded that 
Casey did in fact fall down the stairs. If it also concluded that it was possible for the fall to have 
caused the skull fracture, it would have acquitted Mr. Stevens ofthe murder charge. 
3. Conclusion 
The choice put to the jury was not simply whether the blunt force trauma was caused by 
the fall or by Mr. Stevens. If the Propulsid evidence had been presented to the jury, it could have 
totally rejected the state's theory of death and found that Casey died of cardiac arrest caused by 
Propulsid in combination with Zithromax. Or the jury, believing the entire time the head injuries 
could have been caused by the fall (as some members of the jury must have during the first trial), 
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would have found it much more likely that Casey fell down the stairs. In either case, the jury 
would have acquitted Mr. Stevens of first-degree murder. In light of the above, the Court should 
reverse the denial of the petition, vacate the conviction, and order a new trial. 
E. Petitioner Was Denied the Effective Assistance of Counsel at Trial in Violation o/the 
Sixth Amendment Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel Under Strickland v. 
Washington Due to Counsels' Failure to Discover and Present Evidence of the Size of 
the Skull Fracture Upon Arrival at St. Alphonsus' RMC and Evidence of Older Injuries 
1. Facts Pertaining to Argument 
(a) Evidence a/the timing afthe head injuries 
Trial counsel failed to present evidence that Casey's head injuries were caused prior to the 
time when Mr. Stevens was alone with Casey. The 2001 Affidavit of Patrick D. Barnes, M.D. 
states that: 
Based upon my medical training and experience as a medical Doctor, it is my 
medical opinion that the aforementioned CT scans [taken on December 27 and 28, 
1996] show high force impact trauma to the brain, which is nonspecific in regards 
to proving accidental versus inflicted trauma. The suture separation noted on the 
December 27, 1996, CT scan could not occur in a two (2) to three (3) hour period 
and would take approximately six (6) to twelve (12) hours to occur. The occipital 
skull fracture could be twenty-four (24) to forty-eight (48) hours old or older. The 
high-density hemorrhage in the brain could be three (3) hours to seven (7) days old 
and that the upper scalp swelling could range from three (3) hours to twenty-four 
(24) hours depending on the nature of the i~ury. 
Petitioner's Exhibit G, p. 3. This testimony was available at the time of the second trial as the two 
CT scans and the long bone survey were all completed prior to the first trial. 
The trial court found that the failure to present this evidence was not prejudicial under 
Strickland. CR 2379. 
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(b) Evidence of the length of the skull fracture 
Trial counsel failed to present evidence that the skull fracture, said to be 8 cm in length at 
trial, was actually 3-4 cm when Casey arrived at the St. Alphonsus Emergency Room. Petitioner's 
Exhibit H (2010 Affidavit of Dr. Patrick D. Barnes M.D.). Dr. Barnes states: 
Id,p.2. 
5) After signing the June 11,2001, affidavit, I was contacted again by 
Mr. Glenn Elam and was asked to review again the aforementioned 
sets of CT images in order to try to medically determine the fracture 
size of the patient, Casey Whiteside, upon his arrival at St. 
Alphonsus RMC on December 27, 1996, at 16:35 hours. 
6) I have reviewed again the CT images of the skull films taken at St. 
Alphonsus RMC and determined the fracture size of the patient, 
Casey Whiteside, was approximately three to four centimeters in 
length upon his arrival at St. Alphonsus RMC on December 27, 
1996. 
7) The three-to-four-centimeter fracture is located in the right occipital 
are[a] of the skull and was slightly diastatic. However, very slight. 
8) It is my medical opinion that a fracture of this type could have 
potentially resulted from a stairway fall resulting in impact to the 
skull of Casey Whiteside. 
In response to these affidavits, the state argued that Dr. Barnes's opinion regarding the size 
of the skull fracture was suspect because he had not reviewed the skull X-rays which were taken 
at St. Luke's RMC seventeen hours after the St. AI's CTs, i.e., at 7:53 a.m., on December 28, 
1996. CR 1848 ("A reasonably competent attorney would never have presented an expert opinion 
that was based on only the CT scans of the brain and not the x-rays of Casey's skull."). In reply, 
Dr. Barnes reviewed the X-rays and said this: 
7. Recently, I have been asked to review a digital copy of State's Exhibits 84, 85 
and 86 in the case of State v. Edward Stevens and have done so. 
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8. State's Exhibits 84, 85, and 86 are X-rays taken at St. Luke's RMC on 
12/2811996 taken approximately 15 hours after the CT scans at St. Alphonsus's 
RMC. 
9. After my review, I continue to hold my previous opinion that the length of the 
skull fracture when the child arrived at St. Alphonsus's RMC was 3-4 cm to a 
reasonable degree of medical certainty. 
10. While I am informed that the record demonstrates Dr. Slaughter testified he 
conducted the autopsy of Casey Whitehead and concluded the fracture was 
approximately 8 cm long, I understand that the autopsy was not performed until 
112911997 [sic-12/2911996]. 
11. It is my opinion after reviewing State's Exhibits 84-86, that the fracture size at 
arrival at St. Alphonsus's RMC was 3-4 cm and the images taken at St. Luke's 
RMC show the result of intracranial pressure which caused the length of the skull 
fracture to increase to 8 cm. 
Petitioner's Exhibit I, p. 2 (2011 Affidavit of Dr. Barnes). 
In addition, Dr. Cyril Wecht reviewed Dr. Barnes's 2010 and 2011 affidavits, the St. AI's 
CT scans and the St Luke's X-rays and stated: 
8. I fully concur with the opinions set forth by Dr. Barnes in his two affidavits. 
9. The fact that the fracture depicted in the St. Alphonsus Regional Medical 
Center CT scans is 3 to 4 cm rather than the 8 cm length (as testified to by the 
prosecution's expert initially) strengthens and buttresses my opinion that this 
fracture could quite easily have been caused by an accidental fall. There is no 
scientific basis for an absolute, rigid conclusion that such a skull fracture could 
only have been sustained through the deliberate infliction of force by a third party. 
Petitioner's Exhibit L, p. 2 (2011 Affidavit of Dr. Wecht). 
The Court found that it was not unreasonable for trial counsel to fail to find this evidence 
prior to trial and thus not deficient performance under Strickland. CR 23 77. 
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2. Why Relief Should be Granted 
(a) Trial counsel's investigation into these matters was deficient 
At the evidentiary hearing, lead defense counsel admitted that the defense team did not 
consult with a radiologist prior to trial. He also testified that he did not present any of the 
evidence contained in Exhibits H and I at trial and that there was no strategic reason for omitting 
the evidence. 
Q. Did you present the evidence within these affidavits at the trial in 1998? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. I particularly want to draw your attention to the content regarding the size of 
the skull fracture, of Casey's skull fracture upon arrival at Saint AI's. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was there any testimony about that from the defense at trial? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you consult with a radiologist in preparation for this trial? 
A. I don't believe we did. 
Q. Did you present any expert testimony at this trial? 
A. We did. 
Q. Was one of those experts a Dr. Plunkett? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And he is a forensic pathologist? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Dr. Barnes is what speciality? 
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A. He's a pediatric radiologist. 
Q. Would you agree that Dr. Barnes would be better qualified to review the 
images in this case? 
A. Absolutely. 
Q. Did you have a strategic reason why you did not consult with a radiologist? 
A. Didn't appreciate the significance of it at the time. 
TrPCP p. 153, In. 7 - p. 155, In. 13. Likewise, other members of the defense team did not contact 
a radiologist to review the x-rays and CT scans prior to the 1998 trial. TrPCP p. 554, In. 9-17 
(testimony of Glenn Elam); p. 591, In. 4-6 (testimony of John DeFranco). 
The failure to consult with a radiologist was below constitutional nonns in this case 
because it was obvious to the defense prior to the trial that the size of the skull fracture was an 
important piece of evidence for the state. It was plain that the state would argue that an eight-
centimeter skull fracture could not have been caused by a fall down the stairs and, consequently, it 
must have been intentionally inflicted. Further, it was equally plain that it was the state's 
contention that Mr. Stevens must have been the one who inflicted the head injury because he was 
the sole caretaker at the time of the stairs fall. Thus, any evidence of the size of the skull fracture 
prior to X-rays taken at St. Luke's should have been sought by the defense. In this regard, Mr. 
DeFranco also testified that there was no financial impediment to them seeking such a 
consultation: "One of the things about my ex-boss [Ada County Public Defender Alan Trimming] 
is that when you give him a good reason, he'll allow you to use the experts that you need to 
defend the case." State's Exhibit 202, p. 50, In. 24 - p. 51, In. I (Deposition of John DeFranco). 
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The court, however, concluded that there was not inadequate investigation into the skull 
fracture size because they found "experts who all testified that a fall from these stairs could have 
caused a nine centimeter fracture in Casey's occipital bone." CR 2377. (The trial court failed to 
acknowledge that all these expert's opinions were vigorously cross-examined at trial and their 
testimony eventually rejected by the jury in favor of the state's contrary expert testimony.) It 
concluded, "[a] reasonable attorney would not continue to investigate a question for which he 
already had an answer. At this point, a reasonable attorney would have ceased investigation into 
whether a fall down stairs could have caused Casey's fracture and proceeded to more fruitful areas 
of investigation." CR 2377. However, it was not reasonable for defense counsel to simply accept 
the state's assertion that the skull fracture was 8 cm and simply forego any investigation. 
The court's observation that, "Perhaps if one of Stevens' three experts had given counsel 
some indication that this fracture was too large to have been caused by a fall down stairs it would 
have been incumbent upon counsel to have a radiologist double check to make sure that the 
impact actually caused a nine centimeter fracture," proves too much for its position. First, the fact 
that an 8 cm fracture could have been caused by the stairs fall is not proof one existed or was so 
caused. Nor could defense counsel justifiably rely on the opinion of a state expert about the size 
of the skull fracture at St. AI's because no one testified about that at either the preliminary hearing 
or the first trial. 
Further, defense counsel was aware that the state's expel1s would testify that the fracture 
size was far too large to have been caused by a stairs fall. This was obvious from a review of the 
state's expert's testimony from the first trial. Defense counsel testified that they had a copy of the 
first trial transcript and studied it carefully during trial preparation. TrPCP p. 858, In. 16-25. 
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(Defense counsel testified that he read thc transcript "more than once" and used it to "mine for 
information as to specifically what that witness would be testifying about.") That being the casc, 
defense counsel was aware that Dr. Slaughter testified that the fracture was 8 cm long and would 
have required "a large force" to produce. Petitioner's Exhibit B, p. 1104, In. 11-14; p. 1107, In. 
11-13. Defense counsel was also aware that Dr. Brady testified that it was "a massive skull 
fracture" and that a fracture 8 cm long would take "[ a] lot of force. A very great deal of force" to 
create. Id, p. 1147, In. 15; p. 1148, In. 21. (He went on to say, "[t]his kiddy's fracture didn't 
happen from a tumble down the stairs[.]" Jd, at 1151, In. 18-19.) In addition, defense counsel 
read that Dr. Wilber Smith said it was "a very big fracture" that took "quite a blow to cause[.]" 
Id., p. 1253, In. 12-18. And defense counsel knew Dr. Alexander testified that the force required 
to cause the 8 cm fracture was such that it could not have been from a fall down the stairs. Jd, p. 
1204, In. 3-23. So, even though, "Doctors Thibault, Reimann and Plunkett all informed counsel 
that Casey's fracture, which they assumed was nine centimeters, could have been caused by a fall 
down the stairs," CR 2377, defense counsel was also informed that the state's experts were going 
to testify that it could not have been caused in that manner. Defense counsel also knew that the 
testimony about the 8 cm skull fracture was based upon images taken at St. Luke's Hospital on 
December 28, 1996, approximately fifteen hours after Casey arrived atSt. Als' on December 27, 
1996 at 16:35. See Petitioner's Exhibit I, p. 2. Thus, reasonably diligent counsel would have 
taken steps to determine the size of the skull fracture when it was first measured at St. AI's only 
an hour and one-half after the stair fall. 
Finally, the defense knew it needed to neutralize the emotional impact such a large skull 
fracture would have on a jury. As Mr. DeFranco testified: 
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Q. Was one of the difficulties with the eight-centimeter crack an emotional response that 
the jury had to it? 
A. Absolutely. An eight-centimeter, you know, skull fracture was - that was a 
really important aspect of the State's prosecution, and it really dovetailed nicely 
into Shaibani's testimony regarding the dynamics of force that would be required 
to produce that type of injury. 
TrPCP p. 600, In. 11-19. He also noted that: "Just from a commonsense standpoint, a juror trying 
to interpret complicated medical evidence would I think commonsensically believe that a smaller 
crack is suggestive ofless force than a larger crack." TrPCP p. 825, In. 6-11. So, attacking the 
underlying assumption of the state's experts, i.e., that the skull fracture was 8 cm long, was as 
important as finding experts who would disagree with their conclusion. Thus, the failure to 
consult with a pediatric radiologist about the size of the skull fracture when Casey first arrived at 
the hospital was not objectively reasonable. 
(b) Mr. Stevens was prejudiced by the deficient performance 
The failure to present Dr. Barnes's evidence about the timing of the skull fracture was 
prejudicial because it places the fracture occurring at a time when Mr. Stevens was not alone with 
Casey. Mr. Stevens called 911 at about 3:05 p.m. on December 27. The first CT scan was taken 
at 4:35 p.m. that same day at St. AI's. Dr. Barnes's testimony is that the skull fracture could have 
been 24 to 48 hours old at that point. That would put the injury occurring as early as Christmas 
Day. And if the suture separation began six to twelve hours earlier, the brain swelling from the 
earlier injury must have started between 4:35 a.m. and 10:35 a.m., when Casey's mother was still 
at home and several hours before the stair fall at approximately 3:00 p.m. Thus the jury could 
have concluded that Casey's head injury occurred sometime prior to the stair fall but was not 
immediately symptomatic and that Mr. Stevens jumped to the conclusion that the serious injuries 
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to Casey were caused by the fall down the stairs. Further, if Ms. Daniels was aware of the injury 
but keeping that from Mr. Stevens, that would explain why Ms. Daniel's wanted Mr. Stevens to 
call in sick to work and take care of Casey so she could go to work. The evidence that the high-
density hemorrhage in the brain could be three hours to seven days old and that the upper scalp 
swelling could be up to twenty-four hours old also places the injury as possibility occurring 
outside the 10:30 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. time frame argued by the state at trial. Mr. Stevens's defense 
would have been helped by the presentation of this evidence. 
Even more important, however, is that defense counsel failed to discover and present 
evidence that the skull fracture at its inception was much smaller than the 8 cm argued by the 
state. As both defense counsel acknowledged, the state's evidence that the skull fracture was 8 
centimeters long was powerful and needed to be neutralized. 
Q. Was the State's testimony that the skull fracture was eight centimeters a 
difficult fact for the defense? 
A. Absolutely. 
Q. Why? 
A. Because the size of the skull fracture and the separation fit tidily into the 
State's theory that the fall down the stairs could not have cause that kind of injury. 
And the defense rebuttal to that was that the size of the fracture in some 
ways was immaterial because it was subject to the pressure that was building up 
inside the skull of Casey following the injury. 
THE COURT: Okay. So your rebuttal was that the size of the fracture enlarged 
because ofthe brain swelling that occurred afterwards? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
BY MR. BENJAMIN: 
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Q. Did you argue what the size of the skull fracture was upon arrival at Saint AI's? 
A. I don't remember, but I'm sure ifit were possible we would have mapped the 
size of the fracture to show that it was increasing to be consistent with our theory. 
Q. Had you been able to present evidence that the skull fracture was three to four 
centimeters when Casey arrived at the hospital, would you have done so? 
A. Absolutely. 
Q. And would that have been consistent or inconsistent with your defense? 
A. That would have been consistent with the defense and I think that would have 
opened up the door for us to argue that it was more of an accident as opposed to an 
intentional injury. 
TrPCP p. 820, In. 7 - p. 821, In. 16. 
Yet, the defense could not present such evidence because it had not consulted with a 
radiologist. This fact was pointed out by the state during its cross-examination of defense witness 
Dr. Plunkett: 
Q .... Isn't it true that if your child is injured, had a head injury, that you would 
want a pediatric neurologist to respond to the hospital? 
A. I certainly would. I wouldn't want me. 
Q. That's right. And if your child was injured, somehow had a skull fracture, 
broken back or whatever. That you would probably go to a pediatric radiologist? 
How about a radiologist? 
A. Well, I think the primary I would choose someone skilled in emergency care, 
be that an emergency room - skilled emergency room physician. And then I'm 
going to rely on him or her to use the consultants that they want. I'm not going to 
be involved. 
Q. So nowadays in modern medicine when we do MRIs and CAT scans, the 
person who reads those are radiologists? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. With children, would you agree that the pediatric radiologist, too, may be the 
best person to read a baby' s CAT scan? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And share that information with a jury, for example? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And Dr. Plunkett, you're not a pediatrician? 
A. Correct. 
Tr. Vol. II, p. 2008, In. 22 - p. 2003, In. 23. (It is ironic that the state so pointedly criticized 
defense counsel for not consulting with a pediatric radiologist at trial, but so ardently defends their 
failure to do so in this proceeding.) 
Plainly, Dr. Barnes's evidence of a smaller skull fracture would have been extremely 
helpful to the defense. Mr. DeFranco testified: "I would present anyone that would say that it was 
less than eight because I know that eight is worse than three .... And I know those people sitting 
in the box are going to think three is better than eight." TrPCP p. 924, In. 4-21. 
Mr. Odessey also testified he would have used Dr. Barnes's testimony: 
Q. Had you known about Dr. Barnes' opinions expressed in his affidavits in 1998, 
how would that have affected your trial preparation and presentation? 
A. Well he would have testified that the fracture was between three and four 
centimeters, less than half of what the State said, and consistent along with that is 
the Mannitol that was being injected into Casey and the other things that are going 
on is that the swelling, the brain swelling increased the fracture. The increased 
swelling over time caused the fissure to grow to the length that the State put up on 
a big screen in the courtroom. 
Q. And would you have presented that testimony had it been available to you? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Did you have a strategic reason not to put that on in 1998? 
A. No. 
TrPCP p. 158, In. 6-25. 
Recognizing its prejudicial effect, the state emphasized the size of the skull fracture and 
how it could not have been caused by a fall down the stairs throughout the trial, starting in 
opening statement. 
Ladies and gentlemen, the evidence in this case will show you that this defendant 
violently shook Casey Whiteside with his own hands on December 27th of 1996. 
The evidence will show you in this case that the defendant so violently shook 
Casey that his brain rattled within his skull, that this defendant slammed Casey on 
the bath tub in his home on December 2Th of 1996 and he slammed him so hard 
that Casey Whiteside had an eight-centimeter fracture. 
Exhibit D (Supplemental Trial Transcript), p. 293, In. 13-21; see also p. 309, In. 9-12 (Dr. Kim 
"will also tell you that Casey had an eight-centimeter skull fracture"); p. 313, In. 8-12 ("You will 
hear from many experts in this case, ladies and gentlemen, and these experts will all tell you that 
Casey could not have received the fatal injuries that he received from falling down these stairs."); 
p. 313, In. 22-23 (Dr. Slaughter "will tell you that Casey had an eight-centimeter skull fracture") 
p. 315, In. 10-12 (Dr. Brady will "tell you ... that it takes a significant amount of force to cause 
the kind of fracture that Casey had."); p. 317, In. 7-12 (repeating phrase "eight-centimeter skull 
fracture" twice in one paragraph); p. 318, In. 2-8; p. 319, In. 9-10; p. 320, In. 5-6 (Drs. Wilber 
Smith, Bettis, Chadwick and Shaibani will testifY that Casey could not have gotten injuries from a 
fall down the stairs). And the state emphasized the size of the fracture during closing and rebuttal 
arguments, even to the point of ridiculing the defense experts. Exhibit D, p. 359, In. 6-13. 
("Again, if you recall my question to - or statement to Dr. Plunkett about Casey had a massive 
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skull fracture in his temple [sic] and he said, well, I wouldn't say massive. Give me a break. That 
was an eight-centimeter skull fracture, three to four inches, and that wasn't three to four inches on 
my head or your head. That was one-third to one-half of Casey's skull was shattered.") (emphasis 
added); p. 443, In. 12-14 ("And Dr. Thibault, counsel's question was, I don't have a clue how 
Casey got that skull fracture. That was the end of his testimony. I don't have a clue. It didn't 
help you at all."); see also p. 362, In. 25 - p. 363, In. 1 ("the massive skull fracture"); p. 363, In. 15 
("severe skull fracture"). 
A telling indication of the effect the erroneous skull fracture evidence had on the jury 
comes from how then-Judge Eismann saw the evidence. At the sentencing hearing, he concluded 
that the combination of the thickness of the skull at the point of impact and the size of the skull 
fracture proved it was an intentional murder (even though Mr. Stevens was convicted under the 
aggravated battery of a child alternative of first-degree murder). Tr. Vol. II, p. 2269, In. 3 - p. 
2270, In. 2 (finding that the force of the blow was too great to be accidental because the skull 
fracture was 8 cm long in the thickest bone in the skull and concluding that the murder was 
intentional). It is likely that the jury reached the same conclusion for the same reasons. Thus, the 
erroneous evidence about the size of the skull fracture upon arrival at St. AI's was almost certainly 
the determinative factor in finding the skull fracture was intentionally caused. Had the jury heard 
the truth, there is a reasonable probability that Mr. Stevens would have been acquitted and 
Strickland prejudice was shown. 
Moreover, had then-Judge Eismann known the truth about the size of the skull fracture, he 
would not have found the killing was intentional and would not have sentenced Mr. Stevens to 
fixed life. This is also Strickland prejudice. As noted above, the size of the fracture was the most 
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important fact in the judge's conclusion that Mr. Stevens had the intent to kill. And this Court 
used that fact to affirm the imposition of the fixed life sentence on appeal. State v. Stevens, 146 
Idaho 139, 150, 191 P.3d 217,228 (2008). (Fixed life sentence was not an abuse of discretion 
based in part on sentencing court's finding on intent which showed the "grave nature of the crime 
and the character Stevens showed by inflicting such extreme injuries on a helpless and innocent 
child."). But it is impossible to conceive that then-Judge Eismann would have sentenced a 29-
year-old, first-time offender to fixed life absent a finding of intentional murder (and this Court 
would not have affirmed such a sentence.) Mr. Stevens was prejudiced under Strickland both at 
trial and at sentencing. 
3. Conclusion 
In light ofthe above, this Court should find that it was deficient performance for defense 
counsel to fail to consult with a pediatric radiologist prior to trial to determine the timing of the 
injuries and the size of the skull fracture at the time of its first measurement. Had they done so, 
they would have discovered powerful exculpatory evidence. There was reasonably available 
evidence that the 3-4 cm skull fracture occurred and moreover that the suture separation started 
prior to the stair fall. Any argument by the state at this point that the timing and size of the skull 
fracture were not of central importance to its case would be disingenuous. And, as Dr. Barnes's 
evidence would have neutralized these central facts of the state's theory of the case, the Court 
should find Mr. Stevens was prejudiced under Strickland and grant relief on this claim. 
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F. Alternatively, the Cumulative Effect of All the Instances of Deficient Pelformance 
Prejudiced Petitioner so That He Was Denied his Sixth Amendment Right to Effective 
Assistance of Counsel Under Strickland v. Washington 
In analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court should not look to each 
example of deficient performance and determine whether it was prejudicial. Instead, the Court 
should consider all the deficient performance and then determine whether the cumulative effect 
was prejudicial. See Boman v. State, 129 Idaho 520, 527, 927 P.2d 910, 917 (Ct. App. 1996) and 
Reynolds v. State, 126 Idaho 24, 32, 878 P.2d 198,206 (Ct. App. 1994). As the Ninth Circuit has 
explained, "Separate errors by counsel ... should be analyzed together to see whether their 
cumulative effect deprived the defendant of his right to effective assistance. They are, in other 
words, not separate claims, but rather different aspects of a single claim of ineffective assistance 
of trial counsel." Sanders v. Ryder, 342 F.3d 991, 1001 (9th Cir. 2003). Compare State v. 
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148,191 P.3d at 222 ("This Court declines Stevens's invitation to apply the 
cumulative error doctrine to a motion for a new trial.") 
As set forth above, there is a reasonable probability of a different result had the missing 
medical and impeachment evidence been presented to the jury. The trial court erred in holding 
otherwise, and relief should be granted by this Court. 
v. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Stevens asks this Court to reverse the denial of the 
petition, vacate the conviction, and set the matter for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this l-?~day of September, 2012. 
1::k~4~= 
Dennis Benjamin 
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The following are the proposed 
Constitutivnal Amendments to be 
vcted on at the next General 
Election held November 8, 1966. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 
To vote on the following, mark 
a cross (X) in the square at the 
right of HYea" or fINo." 
H. J. R. No. 10 
"Shall Section 9 a f Yes 0 
Article Xl of the 
Constitution of the No 0 
Stat. of Idaho be 
amended to provide 
that the .tock of co,'-
poTations may be in· 
crea.ed only with the 
consent 0/ the per .. 
'011.8 holding (l ma-
;ority of the .tock of 
the cla.. to be in-
creased obtained at 
a meeting held pur-
suant to such notic6 
aB is provided by the 
Legislature 1" 
ATIORNEY GENERAL'S STATEMENT Of 
MEANING AND PURPOSE 
H. J. R. No. 10 
The Idaho Constitution, as 
now in effect, gives every stock· 
holder the right to decide wheth-
er any particular class of atock 
of a corporation will be in-
creased regardles. of whether or 
not he owns any of that class of 
stock. It also requires a notice 
of thirty days be given before 
any meeting for the purpose of 
voting on the questIOn of in-
crease of stock. 
This proposed amendment, if 
approved, will allow only the 
holders of that hartieular claas 
~~e S~~~r!~:' rifn t :u~b~~~e ~f 
shares and also would leave the 
question of the length of notice 
in the hands of the legislature. 
S. J. R. No.7 
"Shall Section 12 Yes 0 
of Article 5 of the 
ConBtitution of the No 0 
State of Idaho be 
amended to author~ 
ite retired Bupr81ne 
court justices and re· 
tired district b!dge. 
to hold district court 
in any county when 
re9ue8ted bll the di.!-
tnct judge, the gov-
erllor or the chief 
;UStiC6, and to sit 
with the's u p r 6 m • 
court, aitd perform 
other duties pertain .. · 
Ing to the judicial de-
partment of govem-
ment, when f·equ6st. 
ed by the supreme 
court or the chief 
justice, lor such com-
penBation a8 fixed by 
the legislature:" 
ATIORNEY GENERAL'S STATEMENT OF 
MEANING AND PURPOSE 
S. J. R. No.7 
The Idaho Constitution aa 
now in etrect. authorizes a hist. 
rict Judge to temporarily hold 
court in another District at the 
request of the District Judge 
thereof or the Governor; and 
authorizes the teml'0rac'y ap-
pointment of a DistrlCt Judge to 
the Supreme Court by the Court 
itselt. 
This proposed amendment, if 
ayproved would authorize any 
District Judge, any retired Dist-
rict Judie, or any ,retired Justice 
~ ~. lluprQtl\o Coun to bold 
court in any District Court at 
the request of either the Judge 
of that District Court, the Gov-
ernor, or the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court. 
This amendment would also 
provide authority of any retired 
District Judge or retired Su-
preme Court Justice to sit tem-
porarily on th'e Idaho Supreme 
Court. 
ThiB proposed arne n d men t 
would also authorize any retired 
District Judge or retired Justice 
of the Supreme Court to per-
form duties in the Judicial De-
partment of Government as di-
rected by the Chief J ustic. of 
the Idaho Supreme Court. The 
proposed amendment would au-
thorize the Legislature to pre-
scribe the payment for such 
services. 
S. J. R. No. , 
S. J. R. No.4 
,jShall Section :1 
Article VllI of thd 
Constitution of the 
State of Idaho be 
amended to authorize 
cities and villages of 
this state to finance 
the purchase, con-
struction and equip-
ping of public recre. 
ation facilities by 
means of revenue 
bonds with the assent 
of two-thirds of the 
'1ualified electors vot-
tng at an election to 
b. held for that pur-
p08e as they are now 
authorized to do with 
~:!fs~c;:~~~te:Oife~= 
tion systems, water 
trsatment p 1 ant 8, 
sewage treatmen t 
Yes 0 
No 0 
"Whether Section 
7, Article I, of ths 
y plants and off Btreet 
es 0 parkinfl facmties?" 
I d a h 0 Constitution No 
shall be amended to 
remove th6 provision 
o ATTORNEY GeNERAl'S STATEMENT Of 
MEANING AND PURPOSE fOT Bix-m.an juries in 
civil actions in'Volv- s. J. R. No, 4 
ing not more than (SecDnd Extuordlnuy Session, 
jive hundred dollar., Thirty-eighth Senion) 
exclusive of cost" The Idaho Constitution, as 
and to provide in~ . IT t r . th 
stead that in civil f~;' ~hich e~, ci~l~r vilf::~~S:~ 
actions wit h in the issue Revenue Bonds. Those pur~ 
iurisdiction of any poses are limited to water sys-
court inferior to th~ terns and sewage collection sys-
district court, 'Whet~ tems, water treatment plants 
er tried in such. in... and sewage treatment plants, 
ferior court or in and off-street parking facilities. district co u r t, the • jury shall consUlt of The proposed amendment,.ll 
not more than. six?' approv~d, WOUld, expand the hst 
of projects whIch rna)' be fI-
ATIORNEY GENERAL'S STATEMENT Of nunced by Revenue Bonds to in-
MEANING AND PURPOSI c!ude public recreational facili-
ties. 
S. J. R. No.6 
The Idaho Constitution, as 
now in effect, provides for aix-
man juries in MIsdemeanor 
cases and in Civil cases involv-
ing less than $500.00 dollars. 
This p r a:r o. e d amendment 
would con tIn u e Misdemeanor juriea at not more than six mem-
berB. Six ... man juries would also 
be authorized In Civil cases 
which could have been com-
menced in Probate, Justice, or 
Magistrate Courts regardless of 
whether the caSe was brought in 
one of those courts or in a Dist-
rict Court. 
H. J. R. No. , 
"Shall Section 4 of Yes 0 
Article Xl of the 
Constitution of the No 0 
Stat. of Idaho b. 
amended to limit tho 
right to vot. at elec-
tions for directors or 
manau~rB of incor-
porated companies to 
every holder of .tock 
of a class to which. 
"oting rig h t. an 
((ranted bl[ the Art-
ICles of In.oorpora-
tim 01 such ,ncor .. 
poratsd companu,f" 
ATIORNEY GENERAL'S STATEMENT Of 
MEANING AND PURPOSE 
H. J. R. No. , 
The Idaho Constitution, as 
now in effect, gives "every stock .. 
holder" the right to vote for di-
rectors and managers of the cor-
poration. 
This proposed amendment, if 
approved, will allow a corpora-
tion through its Article. of In-
corporation to create particu .. 
lar classes of stock without vot-
Ini' prlvllegefl. 
S. J. R. No.7 
"Whether Section Yes 0 
11, Article XX, of the 
~tall\~ c;.,::::!~~ji7.: No 0 
provide that amend-
ments to the c01t.stiw 
tution en1<bracing 
more than one sub-
ject may be submit-
ted to the elector. as 
on. question if the 
proposal was submit-
ted by a duly created 
constitutional revis-
ion commission and 
to provide that an 
amendment of 0 n e 
Bect'ion or article of 
the constitu. tion pro-
posing inclusion or 
excluaion of B U c h 
Bubject matter in an-
other article of the 
Constitution, mUll b8 
,et !earth in and in .. 
~i:n e~oin t'h~che?e~t:= 
rats?" 
ATIORNEY GENERAL'S STATEMENT Of 
MEANING AND PURPOSE 
S. J. R. No.7 
(Snand Extr.ordin.ry S.II;on, 
Thirty.olgh.h s. .. lon) 
The Idaho Constitution, as 
now in effect, can be amended 
only by an amendment which 
contains one Bubject. There is a 
possibility that any proposed 
amendment c:ontaining more than 
one subject matter, even though 
ratified by the people in an elec-
tion, could be declared invalid 
merely because It contained more 
than one subject matter. 
This proposed amendment, if 
approved, will permit the amend-
ment of the Idaho Constitution 
by amendments which eontaln 
ll1£rQ t!lan O!!' .ubi'l!~ Il!l\twt. 
COl:"':Yii c t0Q Oil Judiciary, t\.-~ ,:...c<:; 
307, Fcbru~ry 24, 1955, a~ ~:l~ ~. 
(tV;::: • O:::val Hansen ~~i~ c .. ~:y 
5.J.R. ~o. u ~:::oposin8 
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211 civil ~c~_o~s invol 
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